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This dissertation includes three papers related to climate, resource use, and market applica-
tions for sustainable development in developed/developing countries. The first paper describes the
development of a game-theoretic economic model investigating the linkages between credit and
insurance markets for smallholder farmers, and how a new market tool (weather index insurance)
may help to overcome credit constraints in rural financial markets of developing countries. The
second paper extends consideration of agricultural climate-risk management to potential skill in
predictions of late-season rainfall over monsoonal Indonesia, with the aim of better understand-
ing: (i) forecast skill and risk in this region, and (ii) how forecast information may be better tied
with financial market products, such as index insurance, to improve smallholder farmer incentives,
decision-making, and livelihoods under climate risk. The third paper, in turn, looks at forest re-
source management in Canada, and what the application of new carbon constraints and a market
for carbon would mean for investment, production decisions, and indicators of sustainable forest
management in the Canadian boreal, both in respects to the management of the landscape (i.e. the




List of Figures iii
List of Tables vii
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction 1
1 Weather Index Insurance Design & Credit Access for Smallholder Farmers 7
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Background & Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2 Predictability of SeasonalMonsoonCharacteristics&Weather Index InsuranceDe-
sign 47
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
i
2.2 Background Literature Review: Seasonal Predictability of Monsoonal Indonesian
Rainfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3 Data & Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Predictability of Regional Rainfall Anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.5 Discussion: Linking Predictability of Seasonal Rainfall withWeather Index Insurance 84
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3 A Life-Cycle Analysis of Carbon Markets & Sustainable Boreal Forest Management 91
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115





1.1 Incentive Compatibility Constraints May Reduce the Impact of Insurance on Credit
Rationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.2 The Potential for ‘Basis Risk’ in Index Insurance to Incentivize Effort, and Reduce
Credit Rationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.3 Impact of Enforcement Costs on Credit Rationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.4 Incentive Effects on Credit Rationing when Lenders Hold the Insurance . . . . . . . . 41
2.1 Rain-gauge locations for extracted stations from the NOAA Climate Prediction Center
(CPC) global summary of the day (GSOD) dataset, over Java, Indonesia . . . . . . . . 56
2.2 Climatological rainfall statistics (sum, frequency, and intensity) for the GSOD station
data over Java . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.3 Global (a) and local (b) contemporaneous correlation of seasonal SST anomalies with
SAI of seasonal rainfall total (mm/season) over Java . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4 Global (a) and local (b) contemporaneous correlation of seasonal SST anomalies with
SAI of seasonal rainfall frequency (wet days/season) over Java . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5 Global (a) and local (b) contemporaneous correlation of seasonal SST anomalies with
SAI of seasonal rainfall intensity (mm/wet day) over Java . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.6 Local (Java Sea) SST anomalies conditional on warm (red) and cold (blue) ENSO state 65
iii
2.7 Local climatological wind vectors over the Java Sea Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.8 Local (Java Sea) Zonal Wind – panel (a) – and surface temperature (below 700 hPa) –
panel (b) – anomalies conditional on warm (red) and cold (blue) ENSO states . . . . . 68
2.9 Regional (Java, Indonesia) precipitation anomalies (GSOD station data) conditional on
warm (red) and cold (blue) ENSO states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.10 Climatological monsoon onset and cessation dates over Java, Indonesia, conditional
on ENSO state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.11 Coupling of regional rainfall statistics (sum, frequency, and intensity) to Niño 3.4 . . . 76
2.12 Predictability of the standardized anomaly index of regional rainfall statistics, condi-
tional on a warm ENSO event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.13 Mean MJJ Java Sea SST and near-surface (> 700hPa) temperature anomalies, condi-
tional on a warm ENSO event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.14 Rain-gauge locations for the Indonesian BMG-provided Indramayu station data . . . . 84
2.15 Local-scale, Indramayu Indonesia precipitation anomalies (BMG station data), condi-
tional on warm (red) and cold (blue) ENSO states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.1 The Boreal Plains Ecosystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.2 Initial Age-Class Structure of the Fully Regulated Normal Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.3 Carbon Residency and Decay Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.4 Summary of Lifecycle Carbon Accounting Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.5 Total Proportionate Change in Carbon Sequestered for Different Objectives whenMax-
imizing Specific Forest Management Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
iv
3.6 Total Periodic Harvest Volume over the Planning Horizon, across objectives to maxi-
mize specific Forest Management outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.7 Proportion of FM Area Conserved (i.e. never harvested), under different objectives to
maximize specific Forest Management outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.8 Total Periodic Harvested Volume when Maximizing Harvested Volume vs. Maximiz-
ing Returns to Timber Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.9 Percentage Change in the NPV of Forest Management to the Firm . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.10 Marginal Cost of a Carbon Market for Timber Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.11 Mean Periodic Harvest Volumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.12 Average Percentage of Softwood in Sustained Yield Harvest Level . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.13 Percentage of Total Forest Management NPV Attributable to Specific Carbon Credit
Types (by Pool) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.14 Secondary Emissions Credits by Source for Objective 3: Max NPV of Timber + Life-
cycle Carbon Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.15 Percentage Change in NPV of Forest Management: Including Avoided Emissions from
Product Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.16 Percentage Change in NPV of Forest Management including Avoided Emissions from
Product Substitution vs. Objective to Max NPV of Timber + Lifecycle Carbon . . . . . 133
3.17 Mean Periodic Harvest Volumes over the PlanningHorizon, Across Avoided Emissions
Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.18 Total Net Timber Harvest Revenue per Harvested Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.19 Percentage of Total Harvested Volume Taken from Mid-to-Far Haul Zones . . . . . . . 135
3.20 Average Silvicultural Expenditure per Hectare Harvested over the Planning Horizon . . 135
v
3.21 Total NPV of Carbon Credits Generated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.22 NPV of Carbon Credits Generated, by Pool /Emissions Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
3.23 Percentage of Forest Management Area Conserved over the Planning Horizon . . . . . 143
vi
List of Tables
2.1 t-Test Outcomes from Comparison of Mean Onset/Cessation Dates over ENSO Events 73
3.1 Secondary Emissions Factors Assumed in Carbon Accounting Framework . . . . . . . 111
3.2 Value of a 10-Year Temporary Carbon Credit to a Permanent Carbon Credit . . . . . . 114






I am endlessly grateful to Dan Osgood, both for the opportunities he provided at the International
Research Institute for Climate and Society that inspired much of this work, as well as for his guid-
ance and mentorship (which meant a great deal). Thanks also to my parents, my Aunt Pat, and to






This dissertation is generally structured around an overall frame of climate, resource use, and mar-
ket applications for sustainable development in developed/developing countries. It includes three
papers that, while addressing separate topics, are broadly consistent in their overall application of
market approaches to inform or enable productive investment in natural resource sectors (specifi-
cally agriculture and forestry). The first two papers apply insights from economic contract theory
(first paper) and the recent literature in the climate sciences (second paper) to examine the design
characteristics of a new financial market innovation in developing countries (weather-based index
insurance for agriculture), and its potential to improve poor, smallholder farmer’s ability to under-
take productive investments and manage climate risk. The last paper, in turn, looks at the context
of forest resource management in Canada, and what the application of new carbon constraints and a
market for carbon would mean for investment, production decisions, and indicators of sustainable
forest management in the Canadian boreal. The three papers therefore relate to the question of sus-
taining or enabling investment in specific natural resource sectors over time, and to the particular
challenges posed by climate risk and/or carbon constraints.
The three papers are also consistent in their conceptual approach to the challenge of sustain-
able development – following the Brundtland Commission definition of sustainable development
as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gen-
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erations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987).
While several interpretations of sustainability may be compatible with this phrase, and often differ
by discipline, from an economic perspective it has been operationalized as a non-declining dynamic
condition: whether a flow, conceptualized as non-declining utility by Solow (1992), or a stock, ar-
ticulated as non-declining wealth, or a non-declining ability to maintain living standards over time
(e.g. Dasgupta and Maler 2000, Arrow et al. 2003, Arrow et al. 2004). In the latter condition, it is
important to reflect that an economy’s wealth entails: “the worth of its capital assets ... [including]
not only manufactured capital, but also human capital (health, knowledge, and skills), and natural
capital” (Arrow et al. 2003: 149).
In this context, sustainability can be pursued both by reducing the impact of economic activity
on the depletion of natural resources, in order to pull back from planetary boundaries (Rockstrom
et al. 2009), as well as by capital accumulation in the form of increased manufacturing and human
capital, as well as technological change, to compensate for diminished natural capital stocks (where
possible) in maintaining living standards (Arrow et al. 2004). The papers herein address both
aspects of this sustainability challenge, in different contexts – examining:
1. how carbon constraints, and specifically a price on carbon designed to reduce impacts on nat-
ural systems, may also alter forest management decisions and sustainable forest management
practices in Canada.
2. how innovative financial tools, in combination with other social or human forms of capital
(knowledge, skills, or institutions), can be designed to help increase agricultural investment
and maintain poor farmer livelihoods – which are under increasing risk of climate shocks
(e.g. Guiteras 2009, Schlenker and Lobell 2010).
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In what follows, brief overviews of each paper are provided through the remainder of this
introduction, before each article itself is presented as a individual chapter through the dissertation.
Chapter 1: A Theoretical Analysis of the Link between Weather Index Insurance Design
and Credit Access for Smallholder Farmers
The intersection of climate risk and incomplete financial markets can be detrimental to the de-
velopment prospects of smallholder farmers in poor regions. Weather index insurance is a new
innovation in financial markets that was developed as a risk-reduction tool for smallholder farm-
ers, but has received increasing theoretical and applied interest as a tool to improve microcredit
access in rural areas of developing countries. Much of the academic literature to date examining
the implications of linking index insurance with microcredit has focused on how insurance affects
farmer demand for loans. A great deal of work accordingly remains to study how weather index in-
surance will affect the incidence of credit rationing and the supply of credit to smallholder farmers,
in addition to farmer demand for loans.
Building from insights in seminal works on credit rationing and contract design, this study de-
velops a theoretical model framing the issues of asymmetric information, credit access, and credit
demand in a bundled index insurance and credit contract for smallholder farmers. Analysis is fo-
cused on a basic issue of asymmetric information in the lending contract, moral hazard due to
unobservable farmer effort level, and under what conditions index insurance products will be help-
ful and under what conditions they could be harmful for poor farmer access to credit. The results
of this study show that in the presence of asymmetric information (such as moral hazard), bundling
index insurance with credit can alter the structure of the contracting problem in ways that will affect
not only farmer demand for loans, but also the incidence of credit rationing and the supply of credit
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to smallholder farmers. This finding has important implications for projects that intend to facilitate
smallholder farmer financial market access through index insurance – and relevant conclusions are
drawn regarding how local institutional, environmental, and social conditions may affect the out-
comes of linking weather index insurance and credit contracts.
Chapter 2: Linking an Assessment of the Predictability of Seasonal Monsoon
Characteristics to Weather Index Insurance Design for Java, Indonesia
This paper applies an interdisciplinary approach to investigate the potential for targeted seasonal
forecast information to inform, and be informed by, the structure and design of innovative social
science applications of climate information. It builds from current discussion in the economics
and development literature on the potential for new financial instruments, and specifically index
insurance, to reduce agricultural risk and spur productive investment by poor farmers in develop-
ing countries – and links this to recent advances in the climate science literature on the potential
predictability of agriculturally important events, such as variability in seasonal rainfall statistics,
through broad-scale climate phenomena like the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). The key
innovation of the paper is to illustrate how research into seasonal climate forecasts can be targeted
to inform the implementation and sustainability of index insurance markets, both by reducing the
potential for economic concerns, such as moral hazard, to undermine insurance products, and by
informing the development and structure of index insurance markets to better enable farmers to
incorporate forecast information into their productive decision-making.
Using Java, Indonesia, as a case study, the paper extends observations from the climate sciences
literature on coupling of the South-East Asian monsoon to variability in ENSO, by considering ex-
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tensions of seasonal forecasts specifically targeted to help inform index insurance projects in the
region. Primary results show that previously observed predictability of monsoon onset and early
season rainfall variability can be extended over Java to include forecasts of late-season (specifically
MJJ) rainfall intensity with ENSO events – an observation which is novel to the climate science
literature, and informative for index insurance market design. In addition, emerging ENSO events
are also shown to be tied not only to variability in local (Maritime Continent) sea-surface temper-
atures, but also to locally observable variations in late season rainfall and the timing of monsoon
cessation – which could be indicators of the potential for adverse selection in insurance markets.
Discussion at the end of the paper suggests how the structure of index insurance markets could be
informed by these observations, to both improve insurance market sustainability (a key problem in
developing countries), and support productive investments by poor farmers.
Chapter 3: A Life-Cycle Analysis of Carbon Markets and Sustainable Boreal Forest
Management
This paper describes an innovative approach to analyzing how new potential markets for forest
and wood product carbon in Canada may affect forest management decisions and sustainable forest
management outcomes in the Boreal Forest. It describes the extension of a standard forest manage-
ment model for the Boreal to include a detailed representation of forest and wood product carbon,
in addition to traditional timber production. A detailed life-cycle carbon accounting framework
is built into this model, including tracking of: forest landscape carbon, wood product-stored car-
bon, secondary emissions from timber harvest, transport and milling activities, as well as avoided
emissions from product substitution.
5
Insights derived from an application of this model to a hypothetical landscape for the Boreal
Plains region suggest that assumptions underlying the form of the objective function for forest car-
bon can have significant effects on the forest management (FM) strategies obtained. In particular,
management strategies diverge sharply when the firm’s objective is to maximize the NPV of FM
(including carbon market values), as opposed to maximizing specific forest management outputs
(such as physical quantities of carbon). These findings suggest that readers should take caution in
interpreting the results of papers that evaluate objectives to maximize forest outputs absent con-
sideration of the NPV of these alternative frameworks, as the market incentives faced by forest
management firms are likely to produce substantially different results.
Moreover, incorporating a more complete life-cycle carbon accounting framework into the
model illustrates the importance of properly evaluating different assumptions from the literature
regarding the carbon pools/emission sources likely to be included in a potential market for forest
carbon. It is shown that policy decisions over what sinks/sources will be included in accounting
frameworks as allowable carbon offsets may significantly affect the future structure and function of
boreal forest management areas, with implications for forest-dependent communities, SFM values,
and the nature of the Canadian forest industry.
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Chapter 1
A Theoretical Analysis of the Link between Weather Index
Insurance Design and Credit Access for Smallholder Farmers
1.1 Introduction
Weather index insurance is a topic of increasing interest in poverty and development, as well as
in climate change adaptation discussions. Investment decisions in natural resource production and
environmental services, such as soil erosion, reforestation practices, and water services, can be
impacted by the increasing risk of natural shocks, such as drought, that are expected to occur with
climate change. These observations particularly hold true in developing countries, where the inter-
section of increasing climate risk and incomplete financial markets can be particularly devastating
for smallholder farmers. If financial markets are incomplete, then households may not be able
to smooth their consumption decisions across years by insuring against risk ex-ante, or borrowing
and saving ex-post. For such smallholder households, evidence suggests that costly ex-ante income
smoothing is often undertaken (e.g. Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Moduch 1995) which re-
duces expected profits and alters the household’s ability or willingness to engage in productive
resource investments.
Index insurance is a new innovation in financial markets that has been proposed as one instru-
ment that might help to address incomplete financial markets in rural areas of developing countries.
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As opposed to conventional crop/agricultural insurance, index insurance is relatively cheap, easy
to implement and administer, and offers good contractual incentives (Skees 2008). Index insurance
products were developed primarily to serve as a risk-reduction tool for smallholder farmers, how-
ever there is increasing theoretical and applied interest in using index insurance to improve access
to other financial instruments, such as microcredit, which can help to facilitate smallholder’s abil-
ity to undertake productive investments. For example, by reducing the risk that poor farmers will
default on their loan payments due to drought (or some other indexed hazard), bundling an index
insurance contract with a lending contract may increase farmer demand for loans, or alternatively
may make it possible for microcredit institutions to lend to these groups of farmers for the first
time.
Nevertheless, a great deal of work remains to study the basic mechanism design link between
loans and index insurance; so that we might understand how different local institutional, environ-
mental and social conditions may affect the outcomes of bundling these contracts. Much of the
academic literature to date examining the implications of bundling index insurance with microcre-
dit has assumed that smallholder farmers already have access to credit, and has therefore focused
on how insurance affects farmer demand for loans (e.g. see Carter et al. 2016). However, due to
issues of asymmetric information in the lending contract, it is often the case that poor farmers in
developing countries are credit rationed – i.e. that there is no microcredit institution willing to ex-
tend them a credit contract under any contractual terms. In such instances, it is important to study
how bundling index insurance with credit will alter the structure of the asymmetric information
problem.
Building from insights in seminal works on credit rationing and contract design, this study de-
velops a theoretical model framing the issues of asymmetric information, credit access, and credit
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demand in a bundled index insurance and credit contract for smallholder farmers. Analysis is fo-
cused on a basic issue of asymmetric information in the lending contract, moral hazard due to
unobservable farmer effort level, and under what conditions index insurance products will be help-
ful and under what conditions they could be harmful for poor farmer access to credit. Results
suggest that bundling index insurance with a credit contract will have two separate effects. First,
linking an index insurance product to a credit contract alters the expected return of the contract to
the lender by reducing the probability that the farmer will default. If we can assume a competitive
credit market, this change in the expected return of the contract should then be passed along to the
farmer as a lower interest rate on their loan, spurring farmer demand. While this insight is not new
to the literature (see Carter et al. 2016), we do incorporate an original result by demonstrating the
effect of different lender enforcement costs on the magnitude of the result.
Secondly, the main contribution of this study is to show that index insurance will also affect the
incentive compatibility of a credit contract with moral hazard. Insuring a farmer against productive
risk (such as drought hazard) can have the effect of smoothing the farmer’s returns across states
of the world. Accordingly, the farmer’s incentive to apply higher levels of effort will be reduced,
which in turn reduces the incentive compatibility of the credit contract. However, basis risk in the
index insurance product can work to alleviate the risk smoothing effect of insurance for the farmer
by separating returns across states of the world, conditional on the index. In such cases, the farmer
will be incentivized to apply higher effort by the index insurance product itself, so that the lender
no longer needs to do so through the terms of the lending contract. In this way, index insurance
acts much like a random contract, as studied by Stiglitz (1982) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1988).
Whether the risk-smoothing or the basis-risk effect of index insurance on the incentive com-
patibility of the credit contract dominates is an empirical question. Similarly, how index insurance
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will alter the terms of the credit contract by changing both the expected returns to the lender and
incentive compatibility for the farmer, and thus how index insurance will affect credit rationing
of smallholder farmers, is an empirical question that will depend on local conditions and institu-
tions. Nevertheless, the results of this study show that in the presence of asymmetric information
(such as moral hazard), bundling index insurance with credit can alter the structure of the con-
tracting problem in ways that will affect not only farmer demand for loans, but also the incidence
of credit rationing and the supply of credit to smallholder farmers. These observations will have
important implications for projects that intend to facilitate farmer’s ability to undertake productive
investments by improving financial market access through index insurance.
1.2 Background & Literature Review
Since Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the economic literature has emphasized the potential for limita-
tions in the supply of credit to arise in equilibrium due to market imperfections such as asymmetric
information1 and imperfect enforcement of contracts. Notions of credit rationing have since been
refined in the literature, and now include both ‘conventional’ quantity rationing, where potential
borrowers who lack the wealth to fully collateralize their loans are involuntarily excluded from
credit markets (and cannot obtain a loan at any interest rate), and ‘risk rationing’, where the prin-
cipal (or lender) shifts sufficient contractual risk to the borrower that the borrower voluntarily
withdrawals from the credit market on their own (Boucher et al. 2008). Both types of credit ra-
tioning have been observed and documented among smallholder farmers in developing countries
1Issues of asymmetric information in credit markets may include, but are not limited to: (i) adverse selection (e.g.
non-credible revelation of borrower type); (ii) ex-ante moral hazard (e.g. regarding effort level or investment risk
undertaken by the agent); and (iii) ex-post moral hazard (e.g. regarding the credible revelation of production output or
investment gains).
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(e.g. see Hellmuth et al. (2007) for Malawi; Boucher (2000) & Boucher et al. (2005) for Central
America; and Dupas et al. (2016) for Kenya).
Similarly, the impact of incomplete financial markets on smallholder farmers in developing
countries has long been a topic of inquiry in development economics. If financial markets are
incomplete, then householdsmay not be able to smooth their consumption decisions across years by
insuring against risk ex-ante, or borrowing and saving ex-post; and thus the separation of production
and consumption decisions for such households may not obtain. Some research has argued that in
the absence of complete ‘formal’ financial markets, smallholder farmers are able to ‘smooth-out’
production shocks through borrowing and saving activities in the informal sector (e.g. Fafchamps
& Lund 2003; Townsend 1994; Besley et al. 1993). However, other evidence suggests that these
informal channels are at best only partially effective, and that smallholder farmers do in fact engage
in costly ex-ante ‘income smoothing’ (Rosenzweig&Binswanger 1993; Morduch 1995).2 The type
of risk faced by farming households is an important factors in these debates, as smallholders appear
to be better able to smooth out idiosyncratic risks than covariate ones through informal channels
(Townsend 1990; Banerjee & Duflo 2011).
Index insurance is a new innovation in financial markets that has been proposed as one instru-
ment that might help to address incomplete financial markets in rural areas of developing countries.
Conventional crop/agricultural insurance, which indemnifies the insured party based on verifiable
losses, has several issues that have made it impractical to extend to smallholder, developing country
farmers: it is subject to issues of asymmetric information (i.e. adverse selection and moral hazard),
it is difficult and costly to administer in remote regions of developing countries (especially regard-
2Moreover, these studies suggest that the impacts of incomplete financial markets can be significant; from an
empirical study in India, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) estimate that one standard deviation in rainfall volatility
reduces expected profits by 15% for the median farmer, and 35% for a farmer in the lowest wealth quartile.
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ing claims verification), and it can experience delays in indemnity payouts which are particularly
costly for smallholder farmers. Index insurance may offer a suitable fix to many of these issues.
Because index insurance indemnifies the insured based on the value of an ‘index’3 (as opposed to
verifiable losses), it is argued to be essentially free of adverse selection and moral hazard, and it
has the potential to lower administrative costs while providing for faster, more timely payouts.
Index insurance is therefore relatively cheap, easy to implement and administer, and offers
good contractual incentives (Skees 2008) – and pilot index insurance programs for agriculture are
starting to show positive impacts on farmers’ ability to make productive investments (Carter et al.
2014; Karlan et al. 2014; Madajewicz et al. 2014; Mobarak &Rosenzweig 2012). There have been
at least 36 pilot projects that have introduced index insurance to over a dozen developing countries
(Hazell et al. 2010), and index insurance contracts have been purchased in actual implementations
by tens of thousands of developing country farmers. Nevertheless, studies of index insurance take-
up have often found that farmer demand for the products offered is ‘low’ in three ways: (i) only
a small proportion of farmers buy the index insurance products offered; (ii) the farmers who do
purchase usually buy only the smallest coverage offered; and (iii) the poorest farmers (whom it is
thought would benefit the most) are not usually among the purchasers (Cole et al. 2013; Banerjee
& Duflo 2011). Several reasons for the ‘low’ observed demand in these pilot projects have been
offered. For instance, because index insurance only provides partial risk protection, basis risk4
may undermine its value (Carter 2012). Poor farmers may also buy less index insurance then it is
suggested they ‘should’ due to constraints including: trust, liquidity, and salience of the products
3Ideally, an index is a random variable which is highly correlated with losses, whose distribution is know by both
contracting parties, and which cannot be influenced by the actions of either party.
4Basis Risk: Refers to the fact that index insurance may not cover all losses experienced by an agricultural producer,
depending on the degree of correlation between indemnities and losses suffered. The lower the correlation, the higher
the basis risk.
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offered (Cole et al. 2013; Binswanger-Mkhize 2012).
Standard remedies for ‘low’ farmer demand for index insurance include reducing basis risk
(through better indices, more careful contract design, or improved weather data), educating farmers
(e.g. Cole et al. 2011; Gaurav et al. 2011), or providing premium subsidies (Banerjee & Duflo
2011).5 However, it has also been observed that uptake rates in pilot projects have often been higher
when index insurance contracts are linked to the purchase of inputs (Hess & Hazell 2009). In these
cases, it is not the crop that is insured, but the cost of the input. Increasing attention has therefore
been going to tying index insurance contracts with the ability to make productive investments,
either through linkages to the purchase of inputs, or, increasingly, to credit markets.
Formal linkage of index insurance to credit markets for smallholder farmers would have several
advantages. First, the insurance could open up opportunities for poor farmers to undertake costly,
productive investments; by reducing the risk of farmer default on loans due to covariate risks,
such as weather shocks. Farmers may therefore be more willing to take out loans, and lenders
may be more willing to lend to smallholders, when loans are linked to insurance products. At the
same time, linkages with credit markets may help to encourage farmer uptake of index insurance,
by increasing the salience of insurance products, allowing them to be provided by trusted local
MFIs, and by reducing liquidity constraints (since premiums could be folded into the borrowed
amount). However, despite these advantages, concern remains in the development literature that
farmer demand for index insurance when linked with credit contracts is still ‘low’, due to implicit
insurance that is already present in the credit contracts themselves (Giné & Yang 2009).
In an empirical study inMalawi, Giné and Yang (2009) found that maize and groundnut farmers
5Some current projects appear to be defying the trend of low farmer demand, through design components that
address many of the remedies suggested (e.g. the HARITA project in Ethiopia (see Hellmuth et al. 2009)).
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who were offered a loan contract that was bundled with a weather index insurance contract (for low
rainfall) demanded fewer loans (by 13 percentage points) than farmers who were offered a similar
loan contract, but who were not also required to buy the index insurance. To explain this result,
Giné and Yang develop a model of credit demand where limited liability in the credit contract
reduces the value of index insurance products to smallholder farmers; thereby reducing uptake of
the bundled products. However, Carter et al. (2016) have argued that Giné and Yang (2009) might
be underestimating demand for the bundled index insurance and loan contract, since they do not
properly ‘link’ the two products. Carter et al (2016) argue that by linking the index insurance and
credit contracts (i.e. by allowing the presence of the insurance to affect the contractual terms of the
loan), demand for the bundled index insurance and credit product would increase versus that found
by Giné and Yang. The insurance should average down default risk in to the lender, and thus lead
to lower interest rates.
Other studies have argued that because agricultural lenders/banks already act as implicit insur-
ers for their borrowers, it may be preferable to use index insurance to insure lenders, as opposed
to the farmers. Basis risk is likely to be lower for an agricultural bank than for individual farmers
for large, covariate risks (such as weather shocks), so the benefits of an index insurance contract
may be greater if it is held by the lender (Townsend 2003, Skees & Barnett 2006, Miranda &
Gonzalez-Vega 2011). In this way, farmer demand could be increased, again, by improving con-
tractual terms. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that interest among lenders or governments
to purchase index insurance so far remains limited, despite these potential benefits (Binswanger-
Mkhize 2012). Overall, suffice to say, the impact of linking index insurance contracts to credit
markets on farmer demand for these products remains contentious.
All examples from the literature that have examined the impact of linking index insurance with
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credit markets, though (to the best of our knowledge), have so far assumed that farmers have access
to credit already, even in the absence of insurance - so that there are no constraints to farmer take-up
of loans except the cost of risk. In this study we instead ask: What are the implications of packaging
index insurance with a credit contract for smallholder farmer access to credit (i.e. in cases where
they would be excluded from credit markets otherwise)? We therefore focus on credit rationing,
and examine a more complete problem, including asymmetric information and enforcement costs
in the lending contract. In addition, we ask whether it is possible to use our model to say anything
about who should optimally hold an index insurance policy (i.e. the farmer or the lender). If
linking index insurance with credit markets is indeed desirable, why might interest among lenders
or governments for insurance remain limited?
To address these questions, we develop a model to study not only how index insurance affects
the cost of risk, but also how bundling index insurance with a loan will affect farmer incentives in
a credit contract. Section 3 below lays out the model, including its key assumptions, and how the
form of an optimal credit contract is affected by an ‘inter-linked’ index insurance contract. Section
4 presents the key findings, exploring the incidence of credit rationing for smallholder farmers in
a stand-alone credit contract, versus one that is linked to an index insurance product. Section 5
interprets these results, and Section 6 concludes.
The findings presented here have implications for how to think about incentives and basis risk
when bundling index insurance with a credit contract, contract design in different locations (and
institutional environments), and when or why premium subsidies might be warranted for index
insurance. Accordingly, our observations will offer insights for projects that intend to facilitate




To explore the implications of bundling index insurance within an optimal credit contract, we con-
sider the following structure:
Assume an agent’s (smallholder farmer’s) well being in state of the world j depends on end-
of-period consumable wealth (Cj) and effort put towards production (e) according to the following
additively separable utility function:
U(Cj; e) = u(Cj)  d(e) (1.1)
where: j = g; b; e = H;L; and d(H) > d(L); d0 > 0; d00 > 0. For simplicity, the state of the
world and effort level are both assumed to be binary, with j 2 fgood; badg and e 2 fHigh;Lowg.
Agents (farmers) enjoy initial wealth endowments (W ) and the output of either a ‘safe’ reser-
vation activity or a ‘risky’ investment activity (such as the application of (costly) fertilizer or the
acquisition and use of high-yielding or hybrid seed varieties). The reservation activity can be self-
financed by the agent and yields a return ofXR (in revenue net of production costs). For example,
consider a farmer’s selection of seed variety. The reservation activity in this case might be the
use of traditional seed varieties, which can be obtained from the previous year’s crop. The agent’s
utility under this ‘safe’ reservation activity is therefore:
UR = u(W +XR)  d(e) (1.2)
It is assumed that small farmers cannot self-finance the investment activity, and so they must
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therefore finance the required capital inputs (k) in the financial market (by obtaining a loan). The
relevant example here might be the option to use high-yielding seed varieties, which must be pur-
chased and are costly. If undertaken, the risky investment is assumed to yield a return of Xj with
j = g; b and e = Prob(Xgje), assuming that H > L. It is also assumed that the impact of effort
on returns from the risky investment is sufficiently strong that under high effort the risky invest-
ment is expected to yield a positive return, while under low effort the return to the risky activity is
negative, i.e.:
XH   rk > XR > 0 (1.3a)
XL   rk < 0 (1.3b)
where r = (1 + ~r), ~r is the interest rate charged for the loan/financing, and Xe is the expected
‘gross’ return to the risky investment (i.e. not net of capital repayment) under effort e, such that:
XH = HXg + (1  H)Xb (1.4a)
XL = LXg + (1  L)Xb (1.4b)
As a corollary, note that these assumptions also imply that Xg > rk > Xb.
Previous work by Boucher et al. (2008) (which we have largely followed in setting up this con-
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tract structure) has investigated when an agent would find it optimal to select the risky investment
activity over the reservation activity. Here, we focus instead solely on the investment activity, and
how bundling index insurance with the financing contract might affect the terms of the contract
and the contracting space (i.e. under what conditions index insurance might be expected to relax
any credit constraints faced by the agent).
1.3.2 The Optimal Credit Contract
The loan contract specifies how project returns are divided between the principal (the lender or
bank) and the agent (the borrower or farmer) under each state j. In what follows, we assume a
continuum of identical agent’s of type m. Further, asymmetric information concerning the effort
level provided by the agent (assuming effort is imperfectly observed by the principal), combined
with the assumption that XL   rk < 0, implies that the principal will want to specify contract
payoffs that induce the agent to provide e = H . Accordingly, assuming a competitive credit
market, payoffs for the optimal credit contract (without insurance) solve:
max
Sj
Ej[u(W +Xj   Sj)je = H] j = g; b (1.5a)
Sg = rk (1.5b)
Sb =  minfXb + C; rkg+ (1  ) minfXb; rkg (1.5c)
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subject to:
Lender’s Participation Constraint (LPC):
HSg + (1  H)Sb   !  u (1.5d)
Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC):
[u(W +Xg   Sg)  u(W +Xb   Sb)][H   L]  d(H)  d(L) (1.5e)
Limited Liability Constraint (LL):
W +Xj   Sj   j = g; b (1.5f)
where: Sj = the repayment to the principal in state of the world j; C = the collateral required
by the principal for an agent of typem; ! = loan enforcement costs born by the principal;  is the
probability of collateral seizure by the principal;6 u = the principal’s opportunity cost of funds for
an uninsured loan; and  = the agent’s minimum bound on wealth.7
6Note: We are assuming here that loans will be repaid with probability one in the case of production Xj  rk.
Accordingly, enforcement by the principal only pertains to collection of the collateral (C), in cases where Xb < rk.
Alternatively, it may be assumed that ! is sufficiently high to ensure that production (Xj) will always be put towards
loan repayment first by the agent, so that the only remaining uncertainty in loan collection pertains to whether the
principal will try to collect any collateral, if warranted, as well.
7This minimum bound on agent wealth, , is meant to reflect that the principle might not be able to drive the agent’s
wealth infinitely downward. For example, there might be informal networks of community support that would prevent
the agent’s wealth from being driven below some level, .
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1.3.3 Bundling Index Insurance with the Optimal Credit Contract
Now, suppose that we can structure the credit contract to include an index insurance contract (e.g.
for rainfall) to partially cover the risk of farmer default (due to drought). It is assumed rainfall
(i) can take on two values: high rain (h) and low rain (l), with probability of high rain ( ). The
insurance payout (Ii) is conditional on realized rainfall, and defined as Il = r(k+p), or the financed
capital (k) plus premium (p) plus interest if the realized rainfall is low. If the realized rainfall is
high, then the insurance pays out nothing (Ih = 0).8




Ej[Ei[u(W +Xj + Ii   Sji)je = H]] j = g; b; i = h; l (1.6a)
Sgi = r(k + p) i = h; l (1.6b)
Sbi =  minfXb + Ii + C; r(k + p)g+ (1  ) minfXb + Ii; r(k + p)g i = h; l (1.6c)
subject to:
8Note: This is a simple index insurance contract structure. Other structures, such as I = r  (k + p) for some
 2 R+ are also possible (i.e. the agent may only insure part of their financed capital (k) – such that 0 <  < 1 – or
may in fact over-insure for their financed capital – such that  > 1).
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Lender’s Participation Constraint (LPC):
[H + PHbl ]  r(k + p) + PHbh  Sbh   !  I (1.6d)
Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC):
[u(W +Xg   Sgh)  u(W +Xb   Sbh)]  [PHgh   PLgh]
+ [u(W +Xg + Il   Sgl)  u(W +Xb + Il   Sbl)]  [PHgl   PLgl ]  d(H)  d(L) (1.6e)
Limited Liability Constraint (LL):
W +Xj + Ii   Sji   8j = g; b; i = h; l (1.6f)
where I = the principal’s opportunity cost of funds for an insured loan; and repayment to the
bank (Sji) now depends on both state of the world (j) and realized rainfall (i), since i determines
the insurance payout Ii. Meanwhile, P eji is the joint probability of realizing state j and rainfall i
under effort level e. Using the definition of correlation, and defining e as the correlation between
rainfall (i) and state of the world (j), we can therefore specify:
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PHgh = 
H + H (1.7a)
PHgl = 
H(1  )  H (1.7b)
PHbh = (1  H)   H (1.7c)
PHbl = (1  H)(1  ) + H (1.7d)




Boucher et al. (2008) show that asymmetric information can result in two types of credit rationing:
‘conventional’ quantity rationing, where potential borrowers who lack the wealth to fully collater-
alize their loans are involuntarily excluded from the credit market;9 and ‘risk rationing’, where the
principal, constrained by asymmetric information, shifts sufficient contractual risk to the agent that
the agent voluntarily withdrawals from the credit market (preferring to undertake their relatively
‘safe’, subsistence activity).10 Herein, we explore the change in incidence of credit rationing in the
optimal credit contract when it is bundled with an index insurance contract.
9i.e. Quantity rationed agents would like to borrow at prevailing rates but are not offered a contract by the principal
due to information asymmetries. As a result of the asymmetric information, high interest rate, low collateral contracts
are eliminated from the set of available contracts as incentive incompatible.
10Risk rationed agents therefore have the collateral required to qualify for a credit contract, but the high-collateral
conditions required to make this contract incentive compatible offer the agent a lower expected outcome than their
‘safer’, subsistence activity.
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As mentioned earlier, Carter et al. (2016) have explored how bundling index insurance with a
credit contract impacts on the agent’s demand for both insurance and credit. The basic insight from
their paper is that bundling the two contracts can lead to a reduction in the interest rate charged by
the principal in order to extend funds to the agent. This result occurs because the probability of the
agent failing to repay their loan decreases when they are insured, and if the insurance and credit
contracts are bundled, or ‘inter-linked’, then the reduced repayment risk should be passed along to
the agent by the principal (assuming a competitive credit market).11 However, Carter et al. (2016)
don’t consider information asymmetries in their analysis, and therefore don’t account for how the
bundling of index insurance with a credit contract might impact the credit rationing that can occur
when these asymmetries are present.
1.4.1 Index Insurance and the Incidence of Credit Rationing
Given the type of credit contract specified herein, Boucher et al. (2008) have shown that:
A necessary and sufficient condition for a positive credit supply is that there exists a
contract requiring the agent to pledge her entire wealth as collateral that is both in-
centive compatible and yields nonnegative lender profits. If there are no“full-wealth-
pledge” contracts that satisfy both of these constraints, then the feasible contract set
will be empty, and the agent will be quantity rationed. (Boucher et al 2008, p.414)
The basic intuition is as follows: since the principal wants to incentivize the agent to under-
take high effort, but asymmetric information renders it impossible to write a contract conditional
on agent effort level,12 the incentive compatibility constraint addresses this moral hazard issue by
requiring payouts to the agent to be such that u(Cg) > u(Cb). In other words, the principal mo-
11Carter et al. (2016) also show that this result can be non-linear if the costs to the principal of financing unpaid
loans are taken into account.
12Since the level of effort applied by the agent is imperfectly observable by the principal.
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tivates the agent to apply high effort by offering contracts that reward the agent in the good state,
and punish the agent in the bad state. As a result, incentive compatibility eliminates low collat-
eral, high interest rate loans from the suite of possible credit contracts, since such contracts smooth
consumption for the agent across both states of the world.
Practically speaking, under moral hazard, the constraints on the optimal credit contract constrict
the feasible contracting space by defining both a minimum and a maximum interest rate that can be
imposed – beyond which the contract structure will not remain incentive compatible. According to
the lender’s participation constraint (LPC), there exists a minimum interest rate (rmin) that defines
the lender’s zero expected profit contour (or, in other words, that allows for nonnegative lender
profits). The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), meanwhile, defines a maximum interest rate
(or rmax) that maintains incentive compatibility for the agent (or, in other words, that incentivizes
high effort). If, under a full-wealth-pledge, the terms of the contract are such that rmin > rmax, then
the feasible contract set will be empty, and the principal will not offer any contract (at any interest
rate) to the agent. If, instead, the couple {rmax; C} defined by the ICC is sufficiently onerous
that the the payoffs to the agent from the credit contract are such that UR > UC , then despite a
feasible contract being on offer from the principal, the (risk averse) agent will voluntarily opt out
of the credit market, preferring instead their safe, subsistence activity. These cases correspond to
quantity rationing and risk rationing, respectively (Boucher et al. 2008).
In the analysis that follows, we look at the rmin and rmax that are defined by the optimal credit
contract specified in Section 3 above, and then investigate how these parameters change when the
credit contract is bundled with index insurance. It is not a priori clear that, when considered jointly,
the changes in both rmin and rmax will serve to reduce credit rationingwhen insurance and credit are
bundled. For instance, should both rmin and rmax decrease as a result of bundling insurance with
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the credit contract, then the impact on the incidence of credit rationing would depend on whether
rmin >=< rmax, and could feasibly increase, reduce, or even reverse any impact that bundling
insurance with credit has on credit rationing through the change in rmin alone.
Credit Rationing in the Uninsured Case
For simplicity, assume that Xb + C  rk, and recall that Xg > rk > Xb. In the optimal credit
contract without insurance, we can then use the LPC and the ICC to define rmin and rmax as follows:
From the LPC, we can substitute in for Sg and Sb to show that:





u + !   (1  H)[Xb + C]

(1.9)
Similarly, from the ICC we can derive that:
[u(W +Xg   rk)  u(W +Xb   (Xb + C)  (1  )Xb)][H   L]  d(H)  d(L) (1.10)
) u(W +Xg   rk)  d(H)  d(L)
H   L + u(W   C) (1.11)
which defines rmaxu for any collateral level C, provided @u@r < 0.
Accordingly, for any agent with wealthW and a project with outputXg for state j = g, if under
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a full-wealth-pledge (such thatW = C) the parameters of the problem are such that rmin > rmax,
then there will not exist a feasible credit contract, and the agent will be quantity rationed (i.e. the
principal will not offer the agent a credit contract at any interest rate ~r).
Similarly, the ICC condition above (equation 1.11) implies that there must exist a ‘wedge’
between returns in the good and bad states of the world (or, in other words, for any given r there
exists a C, call it C, which makes the contract incentive compatible, with @C
@r
> 0). If this
‘wedge’ imposes sufficient downside risk on the agent, then the agent will prefer to opt out of the
credit market to undertake their safer reservation activity – and will thus be risk rationed.13 For
agents without sufficient wealth to provide the collateral level C, they will be excluded from the
credit market, or quantity rationed.
Credit Rationing in the Insured Case
We can similarly sub into the LPC and ICC from the bundled index insurance and credit contract
to show that the inter-linking of credit and insurance requires an rmin and rmax as follows:
From the ‘bundled’ LPC, substituting in now for both Sj and Ii, we have that:
[H + PHbl ]  r(k + p) + PHbh  [Xb + C]  !  I (1.12)
) rminI 
1
[H + PHbl ][k + p]

I + !   PHbh  [Xb + C]

(1.13)
13Note: this of course assumes that the agent is not already risk rationed at rmin, or, in other words, assumes that at
rmin we have UC > UR.
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while, from the ‘bundled’ ICC, we have that:
[u(W +Xg   r(k + p))  u(W   C)]  [PHgh   PLgh]
+ [u(W +Xg)  u(W +Xb)]  [PHgl   PLgl ]  d(H)  d(L) (1.14)




(d(H)  d(L))  [u(W +Xg)  u(W +Xb)]  [PHgl   PLgl ]

+ u(W   C) (1.15)
which defines rmaxI for any C, again provided @u@r < 0.
Finally, we can substitute in for P eji in equation 1.14 to obtain:
(H   L)  [u(W Igh)  u(W Ibh)] + (1  )[u(W Igl)  u(W Ibl)]
+ (H   L) [u(W Igh)  u(W Ibh)]  [u(W Igl)  u(W Ibl)]  d(H)  d(L) (1.16)
where, to simplify the expression, W Iji is used to represent the end-of-period wealth of the
agent when their loan was bundled with insurance and the in-period state of the world was j; i.
Accordingly, for example,W Igh = W +Xg   r(k + p), as in equation 1.14.
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How Bundling Insurance with Credit Affects the Incidence of Credit Rationing
Now, to investigate how bundling index insurance with a credit contract affects the incidence of
credit rationing, we need to consider how the bundled contract jointly changes rmin and rmax,
versus the uninsured credit contract. Using the results from equations 1.9, 1.11, 1.13 and 1.15, we
consider the following:
Define rmin as rminu   rminI , so that rmin > 0 implies that rmin decreases when index
insurance and credit are bundled together in the same contract (versus an uninsured credit contract










[H + PHbl ][k + p]
[I + !   PHbh  [Xb + C]]

(1.17)












H  k  
1
[H + PHbl ][k + p]

+ [Xb + C]

PHbh








Accordingly, from equation 1.18 we can see that rmin > 0, unless we have PHbh , [Xb + C],
and p LARGE.
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Next, for rmax, we must look at both sides of equations 1.11 and 1.15. Investigating the change
in the left-hand-side value of equations 1.11 and 1.15, we have:
u(W +Xg   rk)  u(W +Xg   r(k + p))  0 (1.19)
for any given r, the usual assumptions on u(), and p  0. This result obtains simply because
any premium p > 0 reduces the welfare of the agent in the state of the world fj; ig = fg; hg.
Assume for now a fixed rmin. Relaxing credit rationing requires allowing rmax to increase for
any given collateral level C. If the LPC binds, such an increase in rmax would shift the contracting
space, so that the collateral (C) required in order to qualify for a credit contract could decrease
(shifting contractual risk away from the risk averse agent back to the risk neutral principal – and
allowing agents with lower levels of collateral to enter the credit market).
Given that equation 1.19 above, which specifies the left hand side (L.H.S.) of the effect of in-
surance on rmax, is weakly positive (strictly positive if we assume p > 0), then in order for rmax to
increase the change in the right hand side (R.H.S.) of the ICC will need to be even more strongly
positive. If the change in the R.H.S. of the ICC is less strongly positive, or even negative, then the
effect of insurance on the credit contract will be to reduce rmax, thus reducing, or perhaps elimi-
nating (depending on the relative magnitude of the change) any benefits for the agent’s access to
credit acquired through the effect of insurance on rmin. If insurance should reduce rmax sufficiently
(such thatrmax > rmin > 0), it could even increase the incidence of credit rationing versus the
uninsured case.14
Investigating the change in the R.H.S. of equations 1.11 and 1.15, we find the expression:












(d(H)  d(L))  [u(W +Xg)  u(W +Xb)]  [PHgl   PLgl ]





















[u(W +Xg)  u(W +Xb)]| {z }
0
(1.21)
Accordingly, equation 1.21 implies that rmax < 0 iff the basis risk in the index insurance
contract incentivizes sufficient effort from the farmer to overcome the disincentive to effort from
both: (i) the risk-smoothing effect of the insurance contract; and (ii) having to repay the insurance
premium in the good state (j = g).
The intuition here is fairly straightforward. If, in the insured state of the world (i.e. when
i = l), the incentives for the agent to undertake high effort are sufficiently strong – or, in other
words, if u(W + Xg)   u(W + Xb)  0 – then this could reduce the need of the principal to
provide the same incentives via the ICC, so that rmax may increase for any given level of collateral
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C. However, if bundling insurance with the credit contract instead has the effect of smoothing
the agent’s consumption across states of the world j when i = l, then the principal will need to
further increase the size of the wedge that the ICC imposes on the agent, so as to maintain incentive
compatibility.
Practically, then, the effect on the ICC of bundling index insurance with credit will depend on
the size of the difference between Xg and Xb (i.e. on the nature of the investment opportunity),
and on the relative probabilities P eji, with larger differences serving to self-incentivize the agent,
thereby reducing the need for the principal to do so through the ICC. The overall effect of bundling
insurance with credit thus depends on the combined effect of index insurance on rmin and rmax,
considered jointly.
The Effect of Index Insurance on Enforcement Costs
An additional means by which bundling index insurance with credit might affect the terms of the
optimal credit contract, which has not previously been discussed in the literature, is through the en-
forcement costs borne by the principal. In the above analysis, the enforcement costs borne by the
lender, or, more specifically, the cost to the lender of ensuring both the collection ofXj with prob-
ability one and that collateral is collected with probability , is assumed to be exogenously set at !.
However, in a more complete specification of the optimal contracting problem, the probabilities of
enforcement in the LPC would be a function of the chosen level of !. Alternatively, if the inverse
of this problem were considered, for any given (or desired) probability-level of enforcement, the
enforcement costs ! which produced this collection probability could be solved for endogenously.
For simplicity, assume for now that the collection ofXj is relatively costless.15 Assume further
15This condition could hold, for example, if the agent had to sell their output Xj through a centralized market (so
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that the principal’s problem had been used to solve for some ‘optimal’ , which was then input
into the LPC of the optimal credit contract. Following the discussion in the paragraph above, this
 would correspond endogenously to some enforcement cost ~!(), with ! in the LPC then equal
to Ej[~!jH ; e = H] in the uninsured problem, or Ei

Ej[~!jPHi;j ; e = H]

in the bundled index
insurance and credit problem.
Following through with this line of thinking, assuming as above that Xg > rk > Xb and
Xb + C < rk, and again noting that we have assumed that enforcement costs are approximately
zero when collateral does not need to be collected, we have:
In the optimal credit contract (without insurance)
!  Ej[~!jH ; e = H] = H  0 + (1  H)  ~!
= (1  H)  ~!
(1.22)
and in the optimal bundled index insurance plus credit contract
!  Ei

Ej[~!jPHi;j ; e = H]

= PHgh  0 + PHgl  0 + PHbh  ~! + PHbl  0
= PHbh  ~!
(1.23)
Substituting these for ! in the respective LPC and calculations of rmin undertaken above, we
obtain instead:
In the optimal (uninsured) credit contract
that the principal could easily track and centrally collect their output), or, alternatively, if agent’s are simply assumed
to be honest in paying back their loans from realized annual output.
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u   (1  H)[Xb + C   ~!]

(1.25)
and in the bundled index insurance plus credit contract
[H + PHbl ]  r(k + p) + PHbh  [Xb + C]  PHbh  ~!  I (1.26)
) rminI 
1
[H + PHbl ][k + p]

I   PHbh  [Xb + C   ~!]

(1.27)
Now, recalculating rmin to see how ‘endogenously’ adjusting ! in the bundled index insur-
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where, again, u = rk and I = r(k + p). If we refer to this case as rmin!_adjusted, and
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H  k  
1
[H + PHbl ][k + p]

(1.29)
given that we know (1  H) > PHbh .16
Accordingly, we have shown that ‘endogenously’ adjusting ! to the parameters of the LPC
pushes rmin to be more positive than it was when ! was exogenously fixed. Intuitively, this
result obtains because when index insurance and credit are inter-linked, the principal no longer
needs to worry about enforcing collateral collection when i = l (or, in other words, when the index
insurance contract pays out). The principal’s expected ~! therefore decreases, since the probability
of having to incur ~! when insurance is bundled with the credit contract is PHbh < (1  H); where
the latter is the probability of having to incur ~! without inter-linked insurance.
For this result to hold, we need only that the bundled (or inter-linked) index insurance contract
be set up to pay off directly to the principal for any outstanding debt amount (so that the princi-
pal is assured that the insurance payout will be used first to pay off the outstanding value of the
loan). The assumption that the collection of Xj is relatively costless, meanwhile, has important
implications for the size ofrmin and the overall level of rmin, but the general result regarding the
effect of bundling insurance with the credit contract on the expectation of ~!, and subsequently for
rmin!_adjusted > r
min
!_unadjusted, will go through provided that collection ofXj is somewhat less costly
then collection of collateral C.
16Where the strict inequality requires only that PHbl > 0.
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1.5 Discussion
Several interesting implications can be drawn from the results of themodel developed above. These
findings have implications for how to think about incentives and basis risk when bundling index
insurance with a credit contract, contract design in different locations (and institutional environ-
ments), and when or why premium subsidies might be warranted for index insurance.
1.5.1 Index Insurance & Behavioural Incentives in Credit Markets
First, and most importantly, is that if you are trying to understand the effect of linking index insur-
ance with credit markets for smallholder farmers, looking at the effect of insurance on averaging
down risk (i.e. on rmin) is not sufficient if other barriers to small farmer lending remain. The
incentive effects of insurance, as they relate to issues of asymmetric information, are important.
To better develop the relevant intuition, some potential scenarios implied by our model are
illustrated in Figure 1.1. In Figure 1.1, the intersection of rmin and rmax defines the minimum
level of collateral (C) required to qualify for a loan in this credit market. Farmers with collateral
levels less than C will not be offered a credit contract at any interest rate, as such a contract would
be incentive in-compatible. Poor farmers, with low collateral levels, would therefore be credit
rationed in this market. If the loan contract illustrated in the figure were instead bundled with
index insurance, the effect of insurance on averaging down risk (from equation 1.18) implies that
it is likely that rmin > 0, thus rmin would decrease to rmin0.17 This decrease in rmin reduces the
level of collateral required to enter the credit market to C0, opening up access to credit to poorer
farmers, and reducing the risk that holders of credit must incur.













Figure 1.1: Incentive Compatibility Constraints May Reduce the Impact of Insurance on Credit Rationing. While
bundling index insurance with a credit contract can help to reduce the cost of risk (rmin) – thereby improving credit
access by reducing minimum collateral requirements fromC to C0; maintaining incentive compatibility in the credit
contract with insurance may cause rmax to also shift downwards, reducing, or possibly entirely counteracting the effect
of insurance in improving credit access. The downward shift in the maximum possible interest rate that can be charged
while maintaining incentive compatibility is necessitated by the risk-smoothing effect of the insurance product.
However, in the presence of moral hazard, if the risk-smoothing effect of insurance reduces
farmer incentives to provide effort sufficiently enough that rmax > 0, this will work against
the effect of reducing rmin, increasing the minimum collateral requirement from C0 to C00, or
perhaps even C000 (depending on the size of the change in rmax). Only in the case thatrmax = 0
will the gains in credit access obtained by considering the change in the cost of risk (rmin) be
realized. It could therefore be the case that in the presence of asymmetric information, bundling
index insurance with a credit contract would increase credit uptake by less than expected through












Figure 1.2: The Potential for ‘Basis Risk’ in Index Insurance to Incentivize Effort, and Reduce Credit Rationing. If
farmer effort can help to improve output in bad years, so that indemnity payouts do not correlate perfectly with losses,
conditional on effort, then this creates a form of ‘basis risk’ in index insurance contracts. This basis risk can help
to incentivize farmer effort, reducing the need for lenders to do so through the incentive compatibility constraint. If
this incentive-effect of basis risk in the index insurance contract is strong enough, incentive compatibility in the credit
contract could be maintained at higher maximum interest rates, allowing rmax to increase, and further reducing credit
constraints (by lowering collateral requirements for loans).
those obtained by Giné & Yang (2009) by focusing exclusively on the cost of risk may be missing
an important part of the story.
It could also be the case, though, that the incentive-effects from bundling index insurance with
a loan contract will support increased access to credit, as opposed to restricting access. For such a
result to obtain, equations 1.19 and 1.21 show that the incentives for farmers to supply effort under
the bundled insurance plus credit contract must outweigh the risk-smoothing effects of insurance
and the incentive-reducing effects of having to repay the premium in good years. Such incentives
could arise in an index insurance contract through ‘basis risk’; provided that the farmer has suf-
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ficient capacity to increase their expected yields through the application of effort, even in a bad
season.18 In this case, we refer to ‘basis risk’ as meaning that yields in bad years might be condi-
tional on effort level of the farmer, so that the insurance indemnity may not exactly equal losses
(but may be greater than or less than the lost amount, conditional on effort level of the farmer).
Such a scenario is shown in Figure 1.2.
Importantly, a scenario such as that shown in Figure 1.2 is not possible with traditional agricul-
tural insurance products; those which indemnify based on verified losses. With traditional insur-
ance, any additional (and successful) application of effort by the farmer to increase yields in a bad
year will result in a corresponding reduction in the insurance payout. Accordingly, with traditional
insurance products, the risk-smoothing effect of insurance will dominate the incentive effects of
combined insurance and lending contracts. It is the potential for ‘basis risk’ in index insurance
contracts that allows for the possibility of rmax < 0, as shown in Figure 1.2. This specific kind
of ‘basis risk’ means that index insurance can provide incentives much in the same manner as a
random contract (see Stiglitz 1982 and Arnott & Stiglitz 1988).
1.5.2 Index Insurance Contract Design
Moreover, the analysis here also suggests that fully insuring the borrowed amount in bundled in-
surance and credit contracts may not be optimal for improving access to credit. If farmers have
some independent capacity to repay loans in bad years (i.e. if Xb + C > 0), then reducing the
amount insured to some q = k   (for some  small) may not significantly increase the probability
of farmer default. However, reducing the amount borrowed by will improve farmer incentives for
18If @Eb[u()]/@e is sufficiently large, then the basis risk in the index insurance contract will substitute for the need
of the lender to incentivize high effort from the farmer.
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effort, by reducing the risk-smoothing effect of insurance, and by reducing the size of the premium
to be repaid (p). Fully insuring the borrowed amount, if not necessary given local farmer wealth
conditions, may reduce incentives for effort, and therefore reduce the impact of index insurance on
improving credit access.
1.5.3 Local Institutions & Enforcement Costs
Local institutions, as they pertain to enforcement costs of credit contracts, will also influence the
effect of bundling insurance with credit in important ways. As shown in Figure 1.3, and proven
in Section 4.1.4 on enforcement costs, the impact of insurance on averaging down the cost of risk
in credit contracts may be much stronger in high enforcement cost environments (or where certain
institutions which enforce loan repayment are lacking). Figure 1.3 illustrates how the potentially
larger change (reduction) in rmin in a high-enforcement cost environment could help to compensate
for any potential reduction in credit access through corresponding changes in rmax.
Our particular model assumptions suggest that these results regarding enforcement costs may
be most relevant in increasing credit access, ceteris paribus, when collateral collection costs are
high, but where output can be monitored and used for loan collection relatively easily (or at lower
cost). In such cases, it will also be important to structure index insurance contracts so that they are
reliably used to pay off outstanding debt (such as arranging for indemnity payments to go directly













Note 1: r_min-low: Shift in rmin in low enforcement cost environment.
Note 2: r_min-high: Shift in rmin in high enforcement cost environment.
Figure 1.3: Impact of Enforcement Costs on Credit Rationing. The effect of index insurance on the cost of credit
(rmin) may depend on how local institutions and norms affect the cost of enforcing collateral collection in loan con-
tracts. In environments where these enforcement costs are higher, index insurance can have a larger effect on the
lender’s zero profit contour, reducing it further than in low enforcement cost environments by offsetting much of the
expected enforcement costs through indemnity payments.
1.5.4 Who Should Hold the Insurance Policy?
Additionally, the model provides some insights into the question of who (the lender or the farmer)
should hold insurance contracts. Although they may have lower basis risk, and therefore favor-
able contractual terms, lenders and/or governments may not be willing to purchase insurance to
cover farmer default risk when asymmetric information and agent incentives are important factors
in credit contract structure. Unless the purchase of the insurance contract by the principal is an-












Figure 1.4: Incentive Effects on Credit Rationing when Lenders Hold the Insurance. Lenders and/or governments
may not be willing to purchase insurance to cover farmer default risk when asymmetric information and agent incen-
tives are important factors in credit contract structure. Here, the purchase of an insurance contract by the principal is
used to reduce the cost of risk/credit, and correspondingly lowers rmin to rmin0. However, in this case, incentives
are sufficiently important in determining the level of credit constraints (i.e. the amount of collateral (C required to
obtain a loan), and without a corresponding effect of the insurance contract on incentive compatibility of the insurance
contract (by shifting rmax), there is no appreciable reduction in credit constraints. In such as case, it is preferable for
the farmer/agent to hold the insurance contract if basis risk in the index insurance product could also help to improve
incentives.
will be used to reduce the debt owing, then the purchase of insurance by the principal/lender will
not affect farmer incentives; and therefore may not alter credit constraints in a significant way.
For example, consider Figure 1.4. Here, the purchase of an insurance contract by the principal
reduces the cost of risk in the credit contract, and correspondingly lowers rmin (to rmin0). However,
in this case, incentives are much more important in determining the level of credit constraints
(i.e. the amount of collateral (C) required to obtain a loan), and without a corresponding effect
of the insurance contract on rmax through farmer incentives (to, for example, rmax0), there is no
appreciable reduction in credit constraints. In such as case, it may be preferable for the farmer/agent
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to hold the insurance contract.
1.5.5 Premium Subsidies
Finally, our results also have implications regarding subsidy policies. It has been argued that index
insurance is a sufficiently important development intervention as to justify or merit the use of
premium subsidies, so as to increase farmer demand for insurance products (Banerjee & Duflo,
2011). However, if the effects of index insurance on the incentive structure of credit contracts
are sufficiently strong, than previous literature on inter-linked markets and pecuniary externalities
(Greenwald & Stiglitz 1986) provides an alternative justification for premium subsidies grounded
in economic theory.
Asymmetric information imposes costs on credit markets. If index insurance can be structured
so as to function as a compliment to effort, and reduces the need to incentivize the agent via an
incentive compatibility constraint, then index insurance can be seen as an intervention to alleviate
the market failure caused by moral hazard. In such a case, premium subsidies could be justified
based on economic efficiency grounds.
1.6 Conclusion
Much of the academic literature to date on the implications of bundling index insurance with mi-
crocredit has assumed that the smallholder farmers in question already have access to credit. This
literature has therefore focussed its attention on how insurance will affect farmer demand for loans,
and the effect of insurance on averaging down the cost of risk. However, due to issues of asymmet-
ric information in the lending contract, it is often the case that poor farmers in developing countries
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are credit rationed – i.e. that there is no microcredit institution willing to extend them a credit con-
tract under any contractual terms. Access to credit therefore becomes untied from farmer demand,
and will not depend on their willingness to pay different interest rates. In such instances, it is im-
portant to study how bundling index insurance with credit will alter the structure of the asymmetric
information problem, or in other words, to understand how insurance will affect the incidence of
credit rationing and the supply of credit to smallholder farmers, in addition to farmer demand for
loans.
This study has developed a theoretical model framing the issues of asymmetric information,
credit access, and credit demand in a bundled index insurance and credit contract for smallholder
farmers in developing countries. Analysis is focused on a basic issue of asymmetric information
in the lending contract, moral hazard due to unobservable farmer effort level, and under what con-
ditions index insurance products will be helpful and under what conditions they could be harmful
for poor farmer access to credit.
Results suggest that bundling index insurance with a credit contract will have two separate
effects. First, linking an index insurance product to a credit contract alters the expected return of
the contract to the lender by reducing the probability that the farmer will default. This change in the
expected return of the contract, if passed along to the farmer, will help to lower their cost of credit.
While this insight is not new to the literature, we do incorporate an original result by demonstrating
that the cost of collateral collection (i.e. loan enforcement) may significantly impact upon the
magnitude of the result. This has important implications when considering the local context of
where an index insurance project could be implemented.
Secondly, the main contribution of this study is to show that index insurance will also affect the
incentive compatibility of a credit contract with moral hazard. Insuring a farmer against productive
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risk (such as drought hazard) can have the effect of smoothing the farmer’s returns across states
of the world. The farmer’s incentive to apply higher levels of effort will thus be reduced, which
in turn reduces the incentive compatibility of the credit contract. However, basis risk in the index
insurance product can work to alleviate the risk smoothing effect of insurance for the farmer by
separating returns across states of the world, conditional on the index. In such cases, the farmer
will be incentivized to apply higher effort by the index insurance product itself, so that the lender
no longer needs to do so through the terms of the lending contract. In this way, index insurance
acts much like a random contract.
This observation has several important implications. First, in the presence of asymmetric in-
formation (such as moral hazard), bundling index insurance with credit can alter the structure of
the contracting problem in ways that will affect not only farmer demand for loans, but also the
incidence of credit rationing and the supply of credit to smallholder farmers. Second, depending
on the relative importance of incentive compatibility in the credit rationing problem, lenders or
governments may not have sufficient reason to purchase index insurance on behalf of farmers, so
as to lower the cost of farmer default (as several recent studies have argued may be desirable). Hav-
ing farmers purchase the insurance directly, so as to impact not only the cost of risk, but also the
incentive compatibility of the credit contract, will be necessary. Finally, in cases where premium
subsidies are deemed necessary in order to increase farmer demand for insurance, correcting for
the cost of asymmetric information in credit markets may provide an alternative justification for
such subsidies; a result which extends previous literature on inter-linked markets and pecuniary
externalities.
In particular applications, whether the risk-smoothing or the basis-risk effect of index insurance
on the incentive compatibility of credit contracts will dominate is an empirical question. Similarly,
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how index insurance will alter the terms of a credit contract by changing both the expected re-
turns to the lender and incentive compatibility for the farmer, and thus how index insurance will
affect credit rationing of smallholder farmers, is an empirical question that will depend on local
conditions and institutions. It is therefore essential to consider not only how insurance will alter
the cost of risk, but also how local conditions, institutions, and incentives interact with insurance
and credit markets, in order to better understand how index insurance might be expected to impact
smallholder farmer demand in financial markets, and their ability to undertake productive invest-
ments in order to improve their livelihoods. Such considerations gain increasing importance as
investment decisions in natural resource production and environmental services for poor farmers







Linking an Assessment of the Predictability of Seasonal Monsoon
Characteristics to Weather Index Insurance Design for Java,
Indonesia
2.1 Introduction
There is considerable attention in the climate science literature to how the South-East Asian mon-
soon and seasonal rainfall progression over the Maritime Continent (MC) correspond to the El
Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Insights from this literature include well established findings
relating ENSO variability to: MC rainfall anomalies (e.g. Nicholls 1981; Haylock & McBride
2001; Hendon 2003; Aldrian & Susanto 2003; Chang et al. 2003), local and regional scale timing
of monsoon onset (e.g. Aldrian et al 2007; Moron et al. 2009; Robertson et al. 2009, Robertson
et al. 2011), and how this relationship progresses through the peak of the Indonesian monsoon
season (e.g. Hendon 2003; Giannini et al. 2007; Moron et al. 2010). The strong delay of MC
monsoon onset over Indonesia, and in particular the island of Java, identified by this literature is
one of the most pronounced agriculturally relevant impacts of ENSO anywhere in the world, and
is predictable several months in advance with current forecast models.
The temporal modulation of ENSO-related rainfall anomalies has potential implications for rice
production over Monsoonal Indonesia (Harger 1995; Naylor et al. 2001, 2002, 2007); with the on-
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set phase of the monsoon season having been referenced as particularly critical due to its impact
on planting dates (Naylor et al. 2007). This observation has driven much of the attention into
assessing the predictability of monsoon onset, and the relationship of ENSO to rainfall anomalies
through the peak of the MC monsoon, as discussed above. However, little attention thus far has
been focussed on predictability of late monsoon season (MJJ) rainfall patterns, the timing of mon-
soon cessation, or the length of the monsoon season more generally. These weather statistics may
be just as critical for Indonesian rice farmer adaptive decision-making as the timing of monsoon
onset and planting dates – and could influence adaptive decisions as rice farmers progress through
multiple crops cycles, with progressive risk of crop loss due to rainfall variability throughout the
course of the season. For example, depending on the region, a typical Java rice farmer may have
two crops cycles with rice from Oct through to May/June, followed by a third cycle of fallow or a
less water-intensive, dry-land crop. In this context, variability in the planting dates of early-season
crops can affect the planting and timing to maturity of late-cycle crops, and increase the risk of late
season crop loss if rainfall fails before the second or third crop cycle is complete (e.g. see Boer &
Kirno 2003).
Accordingly, increasing our understanding of how early season rainfall anomalies may be tied
to late season rainfall patterns can be critical to enable adaptive decision-making by rice farmers
in Java. Projects aiming to help farmers manage climate or ENSO-driven rainfall risk could, for
instance, design their products to take advantage of any known predictability in end of season rain-
fall anomalies, and thus help to improve farmer livelihoods. Specifically, index insurance, a new
economic instrument receiving increasing attention in the economic and development literature,
has been proposed to help improve agricultural and climate risk management in rural areas of de-
veloping countries – and new pilot projects are currently being explored for rice farmers in Java.
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While a range of potential indexes have been used in index insurance pilots elsewhere (Hazell et
al. 2010),1 many of the larger agricultural insurance pilot indexes globally have been weather-, and
most often rainfall-based (Greatrix et al. 2015). Assuming this trend of rainfall-based indexes is
likely to continue for Java,2 the known coupling of rainfall anomalies to ENSO, and the pronounced
agriculturally relevant impacts of ENSO on rice farmers, makesMonsoonal Indonesia an especially
interesting case study to explore how rainfall-based index insurance programs may be informed by
integrated forecast information, and improved seasonal predictability of rainfall characteristics.
For index insurance designed to help protect farmers against seasonal or inter-annual variabil-
ity in rainfall, forecast information may be particularly salient to the sustainability of the insurance
product. Payouts in such index programs are often directly tied to the forecasted statistic (e.g.
rainfall amount), as opposed to second order outcomes of the forecast, such as crop performance
or harvested yield. In such cases, inadequately accounting for forecast information, or ignoring it
entirely, can lead to inaccurate probabilities of loss informing insurance design, and undermine the
sustainability of insurance programs. Insurance implementers have indeed acknowledged that cli-
mate forecasts may undermine the financial soundness of a product through inter-temporal adverse
selection (Carriquiry & Osgood 2011) – and have advocated strategies such as finalizing insur-
ance contracts months ahead of time, before the forecast is informative (see, e.g., Hess and Syroka
2005; World Bank 2005), or ensuring insurance premiums reflect available forecast information at
the time of issue (Skees et al. 1999).
However, (Carriquiry & Osgood 2011) argue that implementation of these strategies, and their
1A suitable index can be any random variable which is highly correlated with losses, whose distribution is know
by both contracting parties, and which cannot be influenced by the actions of either party.
2Most prototype indexes of which the authors are aware of in Java, including those in which we are involved, are
proposed as rainfall-based.
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application to index insurance market design, is often limited by the lack of a clear conceptual
understanding about how interactions between seasonal forecasts, insurance, and agricultural pro-
duction decisions drive insurance demand. Innovative approaches to including and communicating
skillful forecast information through index insurance products may therefore provide a key frontier
to both improve the sustainability of index insurance projects, while driving demand, by reducing
basis risk and facilitating productive decision-making. For example, skillful forecast information
could inform and provide incentives for different productive investments throughout the agricul-
tural season, such as: the timing of planting and harvest activities, short versus long cycle crop
selection, intra-season decisions on how to transition between crop cycles, and investments in dif-
ferent inputs like fertilizer and seeds. These production benefits are often critical in driving in-
surance demand, and their omission can result in misguided application of forecast information to
insurancemarkets (Carriquiry &Osgood 2011), andmay also affect how forecast information is de-
veloped, analyzed and communicated across disciplinary boundaries, to inform insurance projects
or pilots.
This paper accordingly seeks to investigate potential regional predictability of monsoon ces-
sation and late season rainfall over the Island of Java, Indonesia, with a view towards informing
index insurance projects currently under development in the region. In this effort, it extends the
literature linking delayed monsoon onset and regional rainfall variability during ENSO events to
consider: (i) the potential to predict variability in late-seasonmonsoon rainfall, and (ii) how forecast
information may be better tied with financial products, such as index insurance, to improve farmer
incentives, decision-making, and livelihoods under climate risk. This research focus is articulated
around three guiding questions:
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1. Are characteristics of late monsoon regional rainfall or monsoon cessation over Java, In-
donesia, spatially coherent, and potentially predictable?
2. Are there indicators that can be used to forecast monsoon season length, the timing of mon-
soon cessation, or the regional performance of late season rainfall, for Java, Indonesia?
3. How might any observed forecastable events, and the timing of when forecast information
becomes available, be used to inform or structure an (index) insurance market in Java, and
to support local or regional productive decision-making?
Primary results show that previously observed predictability of monsoon onset and early season
rainfall variability can be extended over Java to include forecasts of late-season (specifically MJJ)
rainfall intensity with ENSO events – an observationwhich is novel to the climate science literature,
and informative for index insurance market design. In addition, emerging ENSO events are also
shown to be tied not only to variability in local (Maritime Continent) sea-surface temperatures, but
also to locally observable variations in late season rainfall and the timing of monsoon cessation –
which could indicate the potential for previously un-accounted for adverse selection in insurance
markets. Discussion at the end of the paper suggests how the structure of index insurance markets
could be informed by these observations, to both improve insurance market sustainability (a key
problem in developing countries), and support productive investments by poor farmers.
2.2 Background Literature Review: Seasonal Predictability of
Monsoonal Indonesian Rainfall
‘Monsoonal’ Indonesia (which stretches from Southeastern Sumatra across the island of Java
and through Bali, to West and East Nusa Tenggara) experiences a distinct seasonal precipitation
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cycle characteristic of a monsoon climate (Giannini et al. 2007), with a principle rainy season
centered on the three-month December-January-February (DJF) period, and a dry season peaking
in JJA (Aldrian and Susanto 2003; Hendon 2003; Giannini et al. 2007, Robertson et al 2011). It
is well known that inter-annual variability in seasonal rainfall over Indonesia is strongly related to
inter-annual variability in tropical sea-surface temperature (SST) in the Pacific and Indian Oceans,
and is associated with ENSO and theWalker Circulation (e.g. Zebiak 1982; Cane and Zebiak 1985,
Aldrian and Susanto 2003). Many studies have shown that ENSO exerts a strong, spatially coherent
signal influencing monsoonal Indonesian rainfall during the SON monsoon onset (or transition)
season, with diminishing coherence into the core (or peak) of the rainy season in DJF (Hamada
et al. 2002; Hendon 2003; Giannini et al. 2007; Moron et al. 2009). In particular, warm ENSO
(El-Niño) events have been associated with anomalously low rainfall during the SON transition
season, and delayed monsoon onset (Hamada et al. 2002; McBride et al. 2003; Giannini et al.
2007; Moron et al. 2009, 2010).
At regional and local scales, low rainfall anomalies and delayedmonsoon onset overMonsoonal
Indonesia have been traced to warm ENSO events using a combination of methods, including GCM
retrospective forecasts and hidden markov models (HMMs) (Moron et al. 2009; Robertson et al.
2009). In the warm ESNO state, anomalous easterlies during the SON transition period have been
shown to support climatological southeasterly monsoonal winds, acting to increase evaporation and
cool SSTs – which, combined with an anomalously warm troposphere, are proposed to suppress
convection and reduce SON rainfall (Hendon 2003; Giannini et al. 2007). However, while the
spatially coherent signal of warm ENSO events has been found to decay in moving from SON (i.e.
monsoon onset) to the peak of the rainy season in DJF, recent analysis of Monsoonal Indonesian
atmospheric circulation patterns have shown that the seasonal cycle may nevertheless be highly
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perturbed throughout the monsoon season, and not just during the SON transition/onset period
(Giannini et al. 2007; Moron et al. 2010).
Giannini et al. (2007) describe a process by which a new thermodynamic ‘equilibrium’ is found
during the January-June period following warm ESNO events, as surface temperatures adjust to
the warmer troposphere. Giannini et al. describe this altered thermodynamic ‘equilibrium’ as
associated with: positive SST anomalies in the Eastern Indian Ocean and around the MC, and
easterly near-surface wind anomalies that are stronger to the north of the island of Java than in
the Indian Ocean to its south. While there is a lack of a spatially coherent large-scale forcing in
this period, Giannini et al. argue that local conditions developed in this new ENSO-influenced
‘equilibrium’ may favour or hinder convection locally, and provide evidence for a north-south
dipolar rainfall anomaly over Java related to this state. This rainfall dipole is characterized by
negative rainfall anomalies along the north coast of Java, but positive rainfall anomalies along
the south coast and over the mountainous areas, and is argued to result from the interaction of
the ENSO-induced anomalous monsoon winds and the local diurnal wind cycle induced by the
complex island topography (Giannini et al. 2007; Qian et al. 2010).
Analyzing DJF atmospheric circulation, Moron et al. (2010) also identify a weather pattern
characterized by anomalous easterlies which is usually relatively infrequent, but becomes predom-
inant following the development of an El Niño event. Moron et al. relate this weather pattern to
the altered thermodynamic ‘equilibrium’ described by Giannini et al. during El-Niño years. The
anomalous easterlies during such events weaken climatological northwesterly monsoonal winds
during the DJF period, resulting in a weak circulation (or weather) type. Moron et al. show that
rainfall anomalies during this weather type, as defined relative to their mean seasonal evolution,
appear to be related to the north-south dipolar rainfall anomaly identified over Java by Giannini et
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al. (2007) and Qian et al (2010).
However, beyond the observation by Giannini et al. (2007) of an altered equilibrium though
the January-June period following an El Niño event, little attention thus far has focussed on pre-
dictability of late monsoon season (MJJ) rainfall patterns, the timing of monsoon cessation, or the
length of the monsoon season more generally. As discussed above, these weather statistics may be
just as critical for Indonesian rice farmer adaptive decision-making as the timing of monsoon onset
and planting dates – and any observed predictability could influence the design of current index
insurance products intended to help farmers manage weather risk, inform their adaptive capacity,
and improve their livelihoods.
2.3 Data & Methods
This study describes an exploratory analysis, designed to assess the strength of associations be-
tween composite sea-surface temperature (SST) indexes, and composite indexes of regional-scale
(Java) rainfall anomalies, based on available rain gauge data. Potential predictability of regional
rainfall characteristics for Java is investigated through examination of lead-lag relationships be-
tween remote (Niño 3.4 region) SST anomalies, and standardized regional rainfall (rain gauge)
anomalies. These relationships are validated by relational assessments examining the underlying
physical drivers connecting remote SST anomalies to regional rainfall variability, including re-
gional SST anomaly and near-surface temperature anomaly indexes, measured for a region around
the island of Java – and drawn from other examples in the literature. Inference in the study is
primarily based around simple correlation analysis between composite anomaly indexes, with the
significance of relationships determined via t-tests.
While analysis in this study is limited primarily to the predictability of regional-scale rainfall
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characteristics, it is meant to extend a broader climate sciences literature linking regional-scale pre-
dictability of MCmonsoon onset to ENSO – with a view to informing index insurance applications
in Java. Results and insights derived from this study relating the predictability of regional rainfall
anomalies to index insurance design are therefore meant to be illustrative, and broadly applicable
to the development of index insurance in the region. Additional research, based on the observations
herein, should work to inform localized predictability of agriculturally-relevant rainfall variability,
so as to better inform index design in specific projects or applications.
In the remainder of this section, the data used in this study are described, and basic relationships
between key indicators are examined to illustrate underlying physical processes relating ENSO,
SST anomalies, and variability in regional rainfall statistics for Java. All datasets used in this
study are publicly accessible and freely available for download through the International Research
Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) Data Library.3
2.3.1 Rainfall Data
Regional level, daily rainfall totals from 1973 to 2010 were extracted from the NOAA Climate
Prediction Center (CPC) global summary of the day (GSOD) dataset. While there are 91 available
stations over Indonesia, only those over the island of Java with less than 30% of missing values
were used for this study – yielding 15 stations for analysis. These stations are concentrated over
North-Western Java, with some disbursement across the rest of the island (or neighbouring small
islands). While North-Western Java is a main rice-producing region, the lack of more uniform
representation of rainfall from across Java could influence results, and should be tested in future
work with more comprehensive data sources, such as satellite-based rainfall data histories.
3http://iridl.ldeo.columbia.edu/
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Figure 2.1: Rain-gauge locations for extracted stations from the NOAA Climate Prediction Center (CPC) global
summary of the day (GSOD) dataset, over Java, Indonesia. Only those stations over the island of Java with less than
30% of missing values were used for this study – yielding 15 stations. Mean daily rainfall amounts during the October
to June rainfall season are indicated by the size of the circle for each station.
Figure 2.1 shows the location of these 15 stations over the island of Java, Indonesia, along with
the mean daily rainfall for each, taken over the October through June rainfall season. Following
Moron et al. (2010), missing entries in the GSOD (Java Region) station data were filled using a
simple stochastic generator with parameters including the persistence of wet-to-wet and dry-to-wet
days and the shape and scale of a gamma distribution (see also Wilks 1999). This stochastic gener-
ator does not enhance any spatial coherence between stations, and does not attempt to reconstruct
the interannual variability of missing entries (Moron et al. 2010).
Figure 2.2 provides climatological information for the GSOD station data – as rolling 3-month
seasonal rainfall amounts running from ASO through to JAS, following the seasonal cycle of the
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MC Monsoon. The solid black lines give the seasonal mean rainfall sum (mm per season), fre-
quency (# wet days per season), and intensity (mm per wet day), respectively, along with the sea-
sonal standard deviations (black dashed lines). Light-grey dotted lines (neutral ENSO periods),
warm ENSO events (red dotted lines) and cold ENSO events (blue dotted lines) are then overlaid
on the climatological values to give a sense how yearly rainfall sum, frequency and intensity are in-
fluenced by ENSO through the seasonal cycle. ENSO events are defined according to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Climate Prediction Center (NOAA CPC) definition of
warm and cold ENSO events.4 The CPC defines warm and cold ENSO events based on a threshold
of +/- 0:5oC for the 3 month running seasonal mean of the Oceanic Niño Index (ONI) for the Niño
3.4 region. Warm (red) and cold (blue) ENSO events are plotted when this threshold is met for a
minimum of 5 consecutive overlapping seasons.
The asymmetric pattern of MC monsoon progression suggested in Figure 2.2, with a relatively
abrupt monsoon onset followed by a more gradual cessation, has been observed elsewhere (Chang
et al. 2005; Robertson et al. 2011). Chang et al (2005) argue that this asymmetric pattern reflects
that the annual progression of the MC monsoon is modulated by a broad-scale seasonal reversal of
winds, which interacts with the complex local terrain – as opposed to a sun-following displacement
of convection. Figure 2.2 also suggests that the seasonal progression in rainfall sum may be mostly
driven by variability in the frequency of rainfall events – as the seasonal cycle of rainfall intensity
is much less marked.
The influence of ENSO events on seasonal rainfall sum and frequency is clearly apparent during
the onset phase. Red (warm) and blue (cold) ENSO years appear mostly sorted to deficit and sur-
plus values, respectively. This respective sorting becomes less apparent once the monsoon moves
4See: www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/ensostuff/ensoyears.shtml
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Figure 2.2: Climatological rainfall statistics (sum, frequency, and intensity) for the GSOD station data over Java.
Solid black lines give seasonal mean values, with values for El Nino (red dashed), La Nina (blue dashed) and Neutral
(light-grey dashed) years overlain. The heavy grey dashed line provides the variance of the standardized anomaly
index (var(SAI)) for each statistic – a measure of spatial coherence across stations by season.
past peak season, with warm and cold ENSO years less clearly allocated into rainfall deficit and sur-
plus events – illustrating the dynamics suggested previously in the literature (e.g. Hendon 2003,
Giannini et al. 2007, Moron et al. 2010): a strong coupling of MC monsoon onset with ENSO
events, which deteriorates through the peak of the rainfall season. Interestingly, the ENSO signal
is less strong for rainfall intensity, where the seasonal cycle is less pronounced.
Finally, Figure 2.2 also provides the estimated variance of the standardized anomaly index
(var(SAI)) of seasonal rainfall statistics, averaged across the stations (heavy grey dashed line; ref-
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erence right-hand y-axis). var(SAI) is provided as a measure of the regional-scale spatial coherence
of events across the station data, and is similarly used elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Moron et al.
2006; 2007; 2010) as a measure of spatial coherence, and hence the potential predictability, of rain-
fall variability.5 In Figure 2.2, spatial coherence of seasonal rainfall sums and frequencies is found
to increase in the dry (vs. wet) seasons – which reflects observations elsewhere (Hendon 2003).
The higher var(SAI) of regional scale seasonal frequency also mirrors observations by Moron et
al. (2007) for other regions in the tropics, who suggest that seasonal predictability of station-scale
rainfall is likely to be enhanced by considering rainfall frequency in place of seasonal rainfall to-
tals. Rainfall intensity, meanwhile, is found to be generally spatially incoherent, and relatively flat
across seasons (except for a slight increase in the MAM to MJJ period – although still remaining
quite low).
2.3.2 SST Data
Global sea-surface temperature (SST) data (60S to 60N) is obtained from the NOAA NCDC Ex-
tended Reconstructed Sea Surface Temperature (ERSST) analyses, available from 1854 on a 2:0o
grid (Smith et al. 2008; Xue et al. 2003). Global and local (Java Sea) sea surface temperature
anomalies are correlated with the standardized anomaly index (SAI) of regional rainfall total (Fig-
ure 2.3), frequency (Figure 2.4) and intensity (Figure 2.5). Outcomes for seasonal rainfall total and
frequency with global SSTs (panel (a) in Figures 2.3 and 2.4) mirror observations from previous
studies (Hendon 2003, Juneng & Tangang 2005, Giannini et al. 2007, Moron et al. 2010), and indi-
cate a negative coupling of dry- through transition-season (JAS to OND) rainfall anomalies to both
the ENSO (Nino 3.4) region, as well as the western Indian Ocean SST (WIOT) region. Rainfall in
5Higher var(SAI) measures suggest more systematic, spatially coherent rainfall outcomes.
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the heart of the rainy season (approx. DJF through MAM), meanwhile, tends to be less correlated
with global SSTs, and coupling with the Nino 3.4 region dissipates during this period.
It is interesting particularly to note the correlation of local (Java Sea) SSTswith rainfall total and
frequency (panel (b), Figures 2.3 and 2.4). The coupling of local SSTs to regional-scale anomalies
in rainfall sum and frequency persists through the early dry season (MJJ) period to the early wet
season (JFM) period, with a transition from a positive (blue) to negative (red) coupling around
OND. This transition reflects a known shifting of local (Java Sea) SST anomalies during ENSO
events, as anomalously cold/warm local SSTs during warm/cold ENSO events dissipate through
forcing from anomalous easterly winds, which impede/reinforce seasonal transitions in monsoonal
wind patterns and reverse local SST anomalies by influencing evaporation potential (Juneng &
Tangang 2005, Giannini et al 2007, Robertson et al. 2011).
Rainfall intensity, meanwhile, is generally found to be largely uncorrelated with SST, both at
the global and local scale, except for a period of strong, positive local correlation in the Java Sea
during the AMJ to MJJ period, which appears tied to broader SST dynamics across the Indian
Ocean basin.
2.3.3 ENSO Index: Niño 3.4 Data
The CPC (NOAA) NCEP extension of SST anomalies for the Niño 3.4 region is used as an index
of ENSO events (Kaplan et al. 1998; Reynolds et al. 2002). While the CPC defines warm (El
Niño) and cold (La Niña) ENSO phases as a minimum of five consecutive 3-month running mean
Niño 3.4 region SST anomalies surpassing a threshold of +/- 0:5oC,6 different definitions have
been adopted in the literature to classify ‘ENSO-event years’. Typically, the temporal sequence of
6http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/ensostuff/ensoyears.shtml
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(a) Global Correlation: SST with Seasonal Rainfall Sum
(b) Java Sea Correlation: SST with Seasonal Rainfall Sum
Figure 2.3: Global (a) and local (b) contemporaneous correlation of seasonal SST anomalies with SAI of seasonal
rainfall total (mm/season) over Java. Shaded areas are significant at the 95% level (t-test).
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(a) Global Correlation: SST with Seasonal Rainfall Frequency
(b) Java Sea Correlation: SST with Seasonal Rainfall Frequency
Figure 2.4: Global (a) and local (b) contemporaneous correlation of seasonal SST anomalies with SAI of seasonal
rainfall frequency (wet days/season) over Java. Shaded areas are significant at the 95% level (t-test).
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(a) Global Correlation: SST with Seasonal Rainfall Intensity
(b) Java Sea Correlation: SST with Seasonal Rainfall Intensity
Figure 2.5: Global (a) and local (b) contemporaneous correlation of seasonal SST anomalies with SAI of seasonal
rainfall intensity (mm/wet day) over Java. Shaded areas are significant at the 95% level (t-test).
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an ENSO event, based on a 1-year event evolution period, involves an event beginning around the
JJA period of the event year (or ‘Year 0’), and dissipates around the MAM period of the following
year (or ‘Year 1’) (Juneng & Tangang 2005). According to this evolution dynamic, sources have
typically defined warm or cold ‘ENSO-event years’ based on SST anomalies in the Nino 3.4 region
during the Year 0 to Year 1 DJF period (Juneng & Tangang 2005) or simply the DJ period (Giannini
et al. 2007).
In this study, we will largely follow the more recent ENSO year definition used by Giannini
et al. (2007), who define a warm/cold ENSO event-year as corresponding to a year with a DJ
(Year 0 - Year 1) Nino 3.4 SST anomaly of +/- 1:0oC. This definition is checked versus the ENSO
events defined by using Nino 3.4 extreme years in the DJF period in Table 1 of Juneng & Tangang
(2005) and found to be largely consistent in warm/cold ENSO year selection. Variations in the
specific ENSO threshold (+/- 1:0oC), and timing (DJ period) used to define ENSO events on the
predictability of Java region rainfall anomalies will also be examined later in the paper as a vali-
dation of results, and as a means to investigate the timing of information revelation for predicting
seasonal rainfall patterns over Java.
Figure 2.6 examines how local (Java Sea) SST patterns may be related to ENSO-event years,
as indicated by anomalies in the Nino 3.4 index. Defining warm (red) and cold (blue) ENSO
events by the convention described above, Figure 2.6 plots the average SST anomalies from AMJ
(Year 0) to JJA (Year 1) for a box over the Java Sea, ranging from 95   135oE and 0   10oS.7
Light red/blue lines depict warm/cold ENSO-event year SST anomalies for this Java Sea region,
while the heavy red/blue lines give the mean SST anomaly over all warm/cold ENSO events for
the 1856-2014 period. The solid black line, meanwhile, gives the neutral ENSO year average SST
7This Java Sea region corresponds to that defined by Hendon (2003)
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Figure 2.6: Local (Java Sea) SST anomalies conditional on warm (red) and cold (blue) ENSO state. Light red/blue
lines depict individual year warm/cold ENSO event SST anomalies. Heavy red/blue lines give the mean over all
warm/cold ENSO events. Solid and dashed black lines give the neutral year average SST and standard deviations, re-
spectively. Red and blue markers indicate seasonal warm/cold ENSO year SST anomalies that are statistically different
(t-test) from the neutral-year values at the 95% (square) and 90% (triangle) levels.
anomaly, with neutral-year standard deviations in dashed-black. Red and blue markers on the mean
warm/cold SST lines show the statistical significance of results of a t-test of warm/cold seasonal
(three-monthly) SST anomaly values against the corresponding season anomaly value in neutral
years, at the 95% confidence (square) and 90% confidence (triangle) levels.
Patterns in Figure 2.6 reflect the intra-season dynamics discussed above, with anomalously
negative local SST values in the JJA(0) to SON(0) period of warm ENSO events switching through
the OND-NDJ period to anomalously positive local SST values that persist through the JFM(1) to
JJA(1) period. In cold ENSO-event years, however, the anomalously warm local SST values in the
AMJ(0) to SON(0) period also dissipate around the OND(0) threshold, but revert more quickly to
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the neutral-year mean through year 1.
2.3.4 Zonal Wind and Atmospheric Temperature Data
Daily 850 hPa NCEP I reanalysis winds and the mean of low-level (below 700 hPa) atmospheric
temperature data are also obtained – which are available from 1948 on a 2:5o grid (Kalnay et al.
1996). While deficiencies with these data are acknowledged, other studies note that at least the
gross behaviour of interannual anomalies tend to be well captured by the reanalyses (Hendon 2003).
Wind and low-level temperature data here are used to better understand the physical processes be-
hind associations of ENSO events, local SST anomalies, and variations in regional rainfall statistics.
Note that Giannini et al. (2007) show prominent atmospheric temperature changes below the 700
hPa level during ENSO events – which informed our threshold selection.
Figure 2.7 provides the climatological wind vectors (direction via arrows and velocity, in m/s,
as shaded pixels) over the Java Sea region for the JAS (dry), JFM (wet), and OND and MAM
(dry-wet, and wet-dry, respectively, transition) seasons – illustrating the progression from seasonal
easterlies in the dry season, to seasonal westerlies in the peak monsoon season, with moderated
winds over the Java Sea in transition periods.
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2.8 then link mean Java Sea region (95   135oE and 0   10oS)
wind and surface temperature anomalies to historical warm (red) and cold (blue) ENSO events –
further informing the local SST and regional rainfall anomaly dynamics observed above. Panel
(a) indicates anomalous zonal easterlies emerging around the SON period in warm ENSO years,
persisting through the peak of the monsoon season over the Java Sea. These anomalous easterlies
serve to moderate seasonal monsoon westerlies during the peak season, slowing evaporation and
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Figure 2.7: Local climatological wind vectors over the Java Sea Region. Wind direction indicated by arrows, with
wind speed (m/s) provided by shaded scale. Seasons provided indicate prevailing winds during dry (JAS), wet (JFM),
and transition (OND, MAM) periods.
contributing to a warming of local SSTs which persists throughout remainder of the monsoon and
subsequent dry seasons. These dynamics also feed into anomalously warm low-level temperatures
over the Java Sea – emerging around DJF/JFM period in warm ENSO years – and also persisting
through the remainder of the monsoon season. These local wind, SST, and low-level temperature
dynamics correspond to the same physical processes that are shown to drive an altered thermody-




Figure 2.8: Local (Java Sea) Zonal Wind – panel (a) – and surface temperature (below 700 hPa) – panel (b) – anoma-
lies conditional on warm (red) and cold (blue) ENSO states. Light red/blue lines depict individual year warm/cold
ENSO event anomalies. Heavy red/blue lines give the mean anomalies over all warm/cold ENSO events. Solid and
dashed black lines give the neutral year average SST and standard deviations, respectively. Red and blue markers
indicate seasonal warm/cold ENSO year anomalies that are statistically different (t-test) from the neutral-year values
at the 95% (square) and 90% (triangle) levels.
Anomalous zonal westerlies during cold ENSO events, meanwhile, serve to reinforce seasonal
wind vectors, increasing both local wind speeds and potential evaporation – and leading to a cooling
of local SSTs through the OND transition season of La Nina years back towards the neutral year
mean. The coupling of local wind and SST anomalies to anomalous atmospheric temperatures is
also found to be absent in cold ENSO events (Figure 2.8, panel (b)).
2.4 Predictability of Regional Rainfall Anomalies
Figure 2.9 examines how warm/cold ENSO-event years correspond to regional rainfall anomalies
across Java – with the significance of deviations again identified in reference to neutral years. The
coupling of early season rainfall anomalies to ENSO events – well established in the literature cited
above – is readily apparent here, as warm ESNO events are tied to deficit rainfall amounts in the
ASO-NDJ dry-to-wet transition period, before the signal dissipates in the peak wet season. Cold
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Figure 2.9: Regional (Java, Indonesia) precipitation anomalies (GSOD station data) conditional on warm (red) and
cold (blue) ENSO states. Light red/blue lines depict individual year warm/cold ENSO event anomalies. Heavy red/blue
lines give the mean anomalies over all warm/cold ENSO events. Solid and dashed black lines give the neutral year
average SST and standard deviations, respectively. Red and blue markers indicate seasonal warm/cold ENSO year
anomalies that are statistically different (t-test) from the neutral-year values at the 95% (square) and 90% (triangle)
levels.
ENSO events are also linked, generating surplus rainfall amounts late in the dry-to-wet transition
period, although these are somewhat less persistent through the transition season than the deficits
tied to El Niño years.
Switching to examining the late season, coupling of ENSO events with rainfall anomalies again
emerges, particularly for the warm ENSO state. As opposed to early season coupling of warm
ENSO events to deficit rainfall, however, patterns at the end of the season suggest warm ENSO
events may be linked to surplus rainfall – specifically during the AMJ-MJJ wet-to-dry transition
period. The timing of this late season coupling of rainfall anomalies to El Niño suggests the poten-
tial for ENSO to be linked not only to monsoon onset, but also to the timing of monsoon cessation,
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and overall monsoon season length – which is explored further below.
2.4.1 Coupling of Monsoon Cessation & Season Length with ENSO-Year
Events
Exploring the relationship between ENSO, monsoon cessation, and monsoon season length re-
quires suitable definitions for the timing of monsoon onset and cessation events. We adopt here
two different agronomic definitions of onset from the literature, and amend these to apply to the
timing of cessation as well. Previous studies that have adopted an agronomic perspective argue
that by defining onset according to the first ’significant’ rains, as opposed to broader-scale atmo-
spheric conditions (e.g. wind speed, used by Taniguchi &Koike 2006), onset timing is more closely
linked to important agronomic decisions, such as the potential to sow crops while avoiding damage
(Sivakumar 1988, Moron et al. 2010). A similar concept of cessation, as the last ’significant’ rains,
is correspondingly developed and described below.
While various agronomic definitions of onset have been used in the literature, the primary
definition applied here follows Moron et al. (2009) – referred to as MRB – in defining onset as the
first wet day (rainfall > 1mm) of the first 5-day wet sequence receiving at least 40mm, which is
not followed by a dry 10-day sequence receiving less than 5mmwithin the 30-day period following
onset. The second part of this condition is meant to avoid a definition of onset which allows for
initial rainfall events which are followed by long dry periods, or ‘false starts’. This definition has
been modified in more recent research (Moron et al. 2010) to include a more flexible initial wet
sequence threshold (defined in reference to the climatological mean amount of rainfall over a 5-
day wet sequence from August to February), however the earlier definition based on a fixed 40mm
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threshold is preferred here as it performs better when applied to the cessation case. Related research
has shown that while the resulting mean onset date can be sensitive to this choice of threshold, the
interannual variability of onset is largely robust to its specification (Marteau et al. 2009). MRB-
onset is calculated from 1-Aug, which represents the peak of the dry season (Aldrian & Susanto
2003, Hendon 2003).
To examine the sensitivity of our findings to this choice of onset definition, a second, struc-
turally different agronomic onset definition is also applied, following the National Agency for Me-
teorology and Geophysics of Indonesia’s (BMG) definition of monsoon start. This BMG-approach
defines onset as the first wet day (> 1mm) of the first series after 1-Sept where 2-consecutive 10-
day sequences each receive at least 50mm of rain (Moron et al. 2009).
Monsoon cessation is less studied in the literature – so to model cessation a reversal of the
agronomic onset definitions are applied. Reversing the MRB-approach, cessation is defined as the
last wet day of the last 5-day wet sequence to receive greater than 40mm, which is not preceded
by a 20-day sequence receiving less than 5mm within the 30-day period prior to the cessation date
(which would be taken as an indication of a prior cessation event). The ‘false stop’ condition
is extended here to 20-days from the 10-day period used by MRB to avoid false starts, as 10-
day dry sequences are found to be too common during the wet-to-dry transition period to yield
climatological mean cessation dates prior to the peak dry season. This variation reflects that the
wet-to-dry transition period tends to see a more gradual decline in rainfall amounts than the steeper
dry-to-wet onset period (Figure 2.2; also see Robertson et al. 2011).
Monsoon cessation in the BMG-case is a more straightforward reversal of the definition – with
cessation defined as the last wet day of the last series where 2-consecutive 10-day sequences each
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Figure 2.10: Climatological monsoon onset and cessation dates over Java, Indonesia, conditional on ENSO state.
Moving vertically up the Y-axis captures the seasonal progression from the prior monsoon cessation in ENSO-Year 0,
though the following monsoon onset (Year 0), and cessation (Year 1). Moving vertically, transitions between green
and grey segments represent average monsoon cessation dates (green-to-grey), and onset dates (grey-to-green) – with
green segments representing mean monsoon (wet) season lengths, and grey segments representing mean dry season
length. Errorbars reflect uncertainty estimates (one standard deviation) of the average monsoon onset/cessation dates,
across the seasonal transitions shown.
receive at least 50mm of rain.8
Applying these definitions, Figure 2.10 depicts the climatological onset and cessation dates for
Java, taken as the mean of the climatological onset and cessation dates for each station in the GSOD
data set, and conditions these on ENSO state. To read Figure 2.10, understand it as a progression
from Julian Day 1 (1-Jan in ENSO Year 0) at the bottom of the figure, through to Julian Day
610 (corresponding to the 31-Aug, ENSO Year 1), at the top of the Y-axis. Moving vertically,
transitions between green and grey segments represent average monsoon cessation dates (green-
8Note that, for cessation definitions, if the cessation condition is not met prior to 31-Aug in a particular year,
cessation is automatically assigned to be 31-Aug for that year, so as to not overlap the following season onset.
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Table 2.1: t-Test Outcomes from Comparison of Mean Onset/Cessation Dates over ENSO Events
Season MRB-Definition BMG-Definition
Transition EN-NT EN-LN LN-NT EN-NT EN-LN LN-NT
Cessation (Yr 0) 0.166 0.035** 0.146 0.015** 0.075* 0.932
Onset (Yr 0) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.021** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.126
Cessation (Yr 1) 0.219 0.228 0.589 0.335 0.604 0.819
Note 1. Values are p-values – results significant at 90%(*), 95%(**), 99%(***).
Note 2. EN=El-Niño; NT=Neutral; LN=La Niña.
to-grey), and onset dates (grey-to-green) – with green segments representingmeanmonsoon season
lengths, and grey segments representing mean dry season lengths. The figure accordingly captures
an entire monsoon cessation-onset-cessation cycle, as it falls around the typical JJA (Year 0) to
MAM (Year 1) temporal sequence of an ENSO event (Juneng & Tangang 2005). Errorbars reflect
the uncertainty estimates (one standard deviation) of the average monsoon onset/cessation dates,
across the different seasonal transitions shown, while the outcomes of a t-Test on the differences
in mean onset and cessation dates across ENSO states is provided in Table 2.1.
As illustrated elsewhere (Hendon 2003, Moron et al. 2009, Moron et al. 2010), monsoon onset
following the development of a warm ENSO event is found here to be significantly delayed versus
the onset in neutral or cold ENSO years. However, the cessation of the monsoon season previous
to the development of an El Niño event is also found here to occur signficantly earlier that both
neutral (BMG Definition) or emerging La Niña years (MRB & BMG definitions). These findings
suggest that the dry season during years with an emergent El Niño may tend to be longer than that
for neutral or emerging La Niña years – and the outcomes in Table 2.1 suggest that this difference
is indeed statistically significant. Cessation in Year 1, meanwhile, is not found to be significantly
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coupled to ENSO – suggesting that any difference in monsoon season length during ENSO-event
years is driven primarily by changes in the timing of onset.
While less discussed in the literature than the timing of monsoon onset,9 the observed coupling
of previous (Yr 0) monsoon season cessation with emerging ENSO events is consistent with phys-
ical drivers, including the correlation of regional MJJ-JJA rainfall totals and frequencies with Java
Sea SST anomalies (see Figures 2.3 & 2.4), as well as the emergence of Java Sea SST anomalies
with Niño 3.4 around the JJA period (Figure 2.6). This suggests that while the likelihood of de-
layed monsoon onset may be predictable via leading anomalies in the Niño 3.4 index, it may also
be locally signalled by the timing of the previous monsoon season cessation – which is important
economically for insurance market design.
2.4.2 Coupling of Regional Rainfall Statistics to Niño 3.4 Signal
To further investigate the coupling of early and late season Java rainfall with ENSO, this section
turns to specific regional rainfall statistics from the GSOD station data, and how they are predicted
with leading three-month seasonal Niño 3.4 SST anomalies. Attention here is limited to warm
ENSO anomalies (El Niño), given the stronger potential link between mean Java rainfall anomalies
and warm vs. cool ENSO states, as indicated in Figure 2.9. Attention is also shifted here to three-
month running Niño 3.4 SST anomaly values to examine the implications of applying an ENSO
definition closer to that applied by the CPC, as opposed to the Giannini et al. (2007) definition of
ENSO-event years according to the DJ anomaly value (which has been used to this point).
9Hendon (2003) shows that below-normal Indonesian rainfall during the JJA to SON dry season tends to occur with
warm ENSO SST conditions, and SST anomalies around the MC have been tied to the onset stages of ENSO events as
early as April (Yr 0) (Rasmusson & Carpenter 1982; Nicholls 1984) – however in neither case have these anomalies
been explicitly tied to the timing of monsoon cessation.
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Discussion will focus on the potential predictability, using leading SST anomalies in the Niño
3.4 region, of regional rainfall statistics for the SON (Yr 0) period, the JFM (Yr 1) period, and
the MJJ (Yr 1) period. These periods are selected as they correspond closely to what the literature
has identified as key seasonal timings for the coupling of monsoon onset to ENSO, as well as the
dissipation of an ENSO signal on regional rainfall through the peak monsoon season (e.g. Hendon
2003, Giannini et al. 2007, Moron et al. 2010). These periods also correspond, respectively, to the
dry-to-wet transition/monsoon onset season (SON), the peak wet season (JFM), and the wet-to-dry
transition/monsoon cessation season (MJJ).
To these three key seasonal periods is also added the prior MJJ (Yr 0) period, to further examine
the potential for coupling of late season monsoon rainfall with emerging (as opposed to leading)
ENSO conditions in the Niño 3.4 region, and thus the possible signalling of monsoon onset/SON
(Yr 0) rainfall conditions with previous MJJ rainfall anomalies.
Looking at Figure 2.11, panels progress from MJJ (Year 0) in Panel (a), though to MJJ (Year
1) in Panel (d). As opposed to looking at the conditional anomaly in ENSO years vs those from
neutral years, as in the sections above, statistical analysis here examines instead the unconditional
correlation of leading or lagging three-month mean Niño 3.4 SST anomalies with a standardized
anomaly index (SAI) of GSOD regional rainfall total (sum), frequency, and intensity. Statistical
significance of the correlation is again indicated by markers, with triangular markers indicating
that the null of no correlation can be rejected with 90% confidence, and square markers indicating
rejection with 95% confidence.
Panel (a), Figure 2.11, suggests that regional-scaleMJJ rainfall anomalies over Javamay indeed
be influenced by emerging Niño 3.4 anomalies – with MJJ rainfall sum and frequency negatively




Figure 2.11: Coupling of regional rainfall statistics (sum, frequency, and intensity) to Niño 3.4. Panels depict the
correlation of MJJ (Yr 0) rainfall statistics to lagging three-month mean Niño 3.4 values (a), and of leading three-
month mean Niño 3.4 values to SON (Yr 0), JFM (Yr 1), and MJJ (Yr 1) rainfall – panels (b), (c), and (d) respectively.
Statistical significance of an unconditional correlation analysis in each panel is indicated by square (95% confidence)
and triangular (90% confidence) markers.
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(more weakly) correlated with lagged Niño 3.4 starting around the following ASO period. That
MJJ rainfall anomalies may therefore serve as leading, local indicators of emerging ENSO events,
and thus subsequent rainfall anomalies in the following SON monsoon onset period, is reflected in
Panel (b), where SON rainfall deficits are shown to be significantly correlated with leading Niño
3.4 conditions through the same dry season period (commencing as early as the prior AMJ-MJJ
period).
Panel (c), meanwhile, reflects the established pattern that coupling of ENSO events with re-
gional Indonesian rainfall diminishes in the peak wet season. Here, regional (Java) JFM rainfall
anomalies are found to be uncorrelated with leading Niño 3.4 values. However, coupling of rain-
fall with leading Niño 3.4 anomalies re-emerges in the following (Year 1) MJJ period (panel (d)) –
where regional rainfall intensity anomalies are found to be positively correlated with Niño 3.4 val-
ues through the prior SON to FMA periods, and rainfall sumsmore weakly linked through the NDJ-
FMA periods. Interestingly, while correlation of Java rainfall with Niño 3.4 in the SON/monsoon
onset period is negative and driven by both anomalous rainfall frequency and intensity, late sea-
son correlation of rainfall with Niño 3.4 switches from negative to positive, and any potential
connection to rainfall totals appears to be primarily driven by variation in rainfall intensity (with
frequency showing no significant effects). It’s also relevant to note that the coupling of late season
(MJJ) rainfall with leading Niño 3.4 anomalies dissipates in the MAM-AMJ period, reflecting the
usual period of ENSO weakening. Accordingly, it is not the immediately prior (MAM-AMJ) Niño
3.4 values that may be predictive of MJJ rainfall anomalies, but instead leading transition (SON)
through wet (FMA) season anomalies – which correspond more closely to the ’peak’ of leading
ENSO events.
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Sensitivity of Rainfall Anomalies to ENSO-Event Year Definition Thresholds
To further explore the predictability of rainfall anomalies during monsoon onset (SON) versus
cessation (MJJ), Figure 2.12 shifts back to an analysis of how the SAI of different rainfall statistics
varies, conditional on a warm ENSO event. Statistical significance is again evaluated in reference
to the SAI during a neutral ENSO year, with red squares indicating that you can reject the null of
equality betweenwarm and neutral ENSO years with 95% confidence, and triangles indicating 90%
confidence. The three panels on the left hand side give the conditional SAI’s for SON rainfall sum,
frequency, and intensity, respectively, relative to ENSO events defined based on mean Niño 3.4
anomalies during the leading MJJ (solid lines), JJA (dashed lines), and JAS (dotted lines) periods.
The panels on the right hand side give the comparable SAI’s for MJJ rainfall statistics, with ENSO
events defined based on mean Niño 3.4 anomalies during the leading SON (solid lines), OND
(dashed lines), and NDJ (dotted lines) periods. Different threshold Niño 3.4 values are also used
to define ENSO events, as reflected across the x-axes – to explore the impact of this threshold on
the results.
While one needs to be careful interpreting these results, as the numbers of years observed that
meet the more stringent ENSO threshold conditions in earlier periods can be limited when reducing
the Niño 3.4 dataset to correspond to the 38-year GSOD station dataset, the general picture that
emerges is one where the coupling of warm ENSO events with regional rainfall anomalies is robust
to variations around the CPC 0.5 degree Niño 3.4 threshold value in the SON (Yr 0) period, but
is much more sensitive to the threshold in the MJJ (Yr 1) period. In the latter case, significant
anomalies in MJJ (Yr 1) rainfall only emerge for relatively strong (> 0:7o for intensity, or > 9o
for sum) Niño 3.4 thresholds. This suggests that predictability of late season (MJJ) rainfall may
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Figure 2.12: Predictability of the standardized anomaly index of regional rainfall statistics, conditional on a warm
ENSO event. Left-hand plots give rainfall anomalies for SON season sum (row 1), frequency (row 2) and intensity
(row 3), conditional on ENSO events defined for the leading MJJ (solid line), JJA (dashed line), and JAS (dotted line)
periods. Right-hand side plots give similar rainfall anomalies for MJJ (Yr 1) season sum, frequency, and intensity,
conditional on ENSO events defined for the preceding SON (solid line), OND (dashed line), and NDJ (dotted line) pe-
riods. Statistical significance of outcomes is represented by square (95% confidence) and triangular (90% confidence),
and is evaluated in reference to the neutral state using different Niño 3.4 threshold levels to define warm versus neutral
ENSO events (x-axis).
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be linked with ENSO conditional on the strength of the Niño 3.4 anomaly in the SON (Yr 0) to
DJF (Yr 1) period – with much stronger Niño 3.4 SST anomalies required to predict late season
regional rainfall than required to meet the CPC ENSO event definition.
This suggestion is supported by looking at the linkage between local (Java Sea) SST anomalies
and low-level (> 700hPa) temperature anomalies, conditional on the magnitude of the associated
Niño 3.4 anomaly used to define an ENSO event. Using ENSO events defined by mean Niño
3.4 anomalies in the SON period, Figure 2.13 compares mean MJJ Java Sea SST and low-level
temperature anomalies conditional on the Niño 3.4 threshold value applied to the ENSO-event
definition. Niño 3.4 SST threshold values for the SON period of > 1:0o in panels (b) and (d), as
well as a more relaxed mean SON Niño 3.4 anomaly of > 0:5o in panels (a) and (c), are used –
with the former related to the threshold value used by Giannini et al (2007) (although applied here
earlier in the season), and the latter more closely matching the CPC ENSO-event definition.10
Comparing panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2.13, mean MJJ SST anomalies surrounding the Island
of Java are found to be approximately twice as large, and to more extensively cover the entire
Java Sea region, when the more strigent > 1o Niño 3.4 threshold value is applied. Mean low-level
temperature anomalies, meanwhile, are apparent surrounding the Island of Java with the> 1o Niño
3.4 threshold value (panel (d)), but are insignificant at the 95% level in the > 0:5o threshold case
(panel (c)). Note that only pixels with conditional anomalies significant at the 5% level, relative to
the neutral ENSO state, are shaded in the Figure.
Interestingly, these findings link with Figure 2.5, which suggested regional Java rainfall inten-
10Note that it is recognized that the threshold Niño 3.4 index value needed to drive ENSO-like atmospheric forcing
conditions may vary by season. The application of the Giannini et al. (2007) threshold during the SON period here
is meant to be illustrative, and further work should explore how the regional-scale Monsoonal Indonesian rainfall
anomalies are influenced by different magnitude Niño 3.4 events across the monsoon season.
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(a) MJJ SST: Nino > 0:5o (b) MJJ SST: Nino > 1:0o
(c) MJJ > 700hPa Temp: Nino > 0:5o (d) MJJ > 700hPa Temp: Nino > 1:0o
Figure 2.13: Mean MJJ Java Sea SST (row 1) and near-surface (> 700hPa) temperature anomalies (row 2), condi-
tional on a warm ENSO event. Panels (a) and (c) define a warm ENSO event as a three-month mean SON Niño 3.4
anomaly> 0:5o. Panels (b) and (d) define a warm ENSO event as a three-month mean SONNiño 3.4 anomaly> 1:0o.
Shaded pixels are significantly different from the neutral-year mean values for that pixel at the 95% confidence level.
sity to be correlated with local SSTs in the AMJ-MJJ period. Moreover, they are also supported
by prior observations of ENSO-driven zonal wind anomalies serving to reduce MC monsoon sur-
face wind speeds, lower evaporation, and correspondingly warm Java Sea region SSTs during the
monsoon season (discussed in detail above). While these dynamics do not drive spatially coherent
rainfall anomalies during the wet season, the anomalously warm local SSTs and surface air tem-
peratures persist through the wet-to-dry transition period for stronger ENSO events (i.e. for higher
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Niño 3.4 anomaly levels), and correlate with more spatially coherent rainfall intensity anomalies
around MJJ.
These findings reflect a recent literature that relates an intensification of rainfall intensity with
a warmer climate. As discussed in O’Gorman (2015), both rain gauge observations and climate
model simulations suggest that precipitation extremes intensify in response to climate warming,
with daily precipitation in the tropics appearing more sensitive to warming than in the extra-tropics,
although also more uncertain due to sparser data availability. Nevertheless, current estimates sug-
gest the sensitivity of daily precipitation extremes in the tropics is 9% per K, with a 90% confidence
interval of 6-14% per K (O’Gorman 2015).
Previous research has also observed the warming of local SSTs and low-level temperatures
following warm ENSO events shown here, for the January to June (Yr 1) period (Giannini et al
2007). However, analysis of potential coupling of ENSOwith rainfall anomalies during this period
of warmer SSTs and air temperatures has either been limited to, or strongly influenced by, rainfall
during the peak wet season; with the emergence of a rainfall dipole from North to South over Java
observed when rainfall anomalies are averaged over the January to June period (Giannini et al
2007, Qian et al. 2010), or altered weather types associated with these warmer SST-surface temp
conditions observed through to DJF (Moron et al. 2010).
By focussing instead on the more spatially coherent monsoon cessation period, analysis here
suggests that regional-scale rainfall anomalies in the wet-dry transition may indeed be more sys-
tematically coupled with prior (boreal fall) Niño 3.4 anomalies, driven through a tie to warmer
equilibrium SSTs and surface temperatures through the MJJ period. These anomalies are realized
primarily by higher intensity rainfall events, and tied more weakly to total rainfall sums than the
well-established coupling of monsoon onset with ENSO – which propagates primarily through a
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lower frequency of rainfall events. While these results should be interpreted cautiously, particu-
larly due to an over-sampling of GSOD stations in north-western Java in our rainfall dataset, they
are at least indicative of the potential for a more spatially coherent signal to emerge in the wet-to-
dry monsoon transition period, that may be clarified by excluding peak monsoon season rainfall
amounts from the analysis.
A Note on Local-scale Predictability with La Niña Events
While La Niña events are found uncorrelated (or un-coupled) with late season regional rainfall
(Figure 2.9), extended analysis suggests these effects may be more localized for cold Nino 3.4
anomalies. As an example, local level daily rainfall observations for 20 station locations over
the region of Indramayu, Indonesia (a small, 2140km2 flat district along the northern coast of
West Java) were made available from the Indonesian BMG office. Covering 1979-2002, this data
represents an updated and extended version of the dataset used in Robertson et al. (2009). As with
the GSOD data above, stations selected have at least 70% of data available, with missing entries
scattered in time. Figure 2.14 shows the location of these 20 stations over Indramayu, along with
their mean daily rainfall during the October through June rainfall season over the extent of the
dataset.
Re-examining the mean standardized anomaly index for this local station data, conditional on
ENSO state as defined by the DJ Niño 3.4 value and a threshold of 1o, yields the results in Figure
2.15. In comparison to Figure 2.9 for the regional GSOD dataset, both warm and cold ENSO events
now find significant rainfall anomalies in the monsoon cessation (AMJ-JJA) period. Moreover,
while the anomalies conditional on warm versus cold ENSO events diverge in the monsoon onset
(SON-NDJ) period, they align in the cessation period as positive anomalies irrespective of whether
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Figure 2.14: Rain-gauge locations for the Indonesian BMG-provided Indramayu station data. Only those stations
with less than 30% of missing values were used for this study – yielding 20 stations. Mean daily rainfall amounts
during the October to June rainfall season are indicated by the size of the circle for each station.
tied to an El Niño or LaNiña event. This suggests that the local-scale coupling of late season rainfall
with cold, as well as warm, ENSO events may merit consideration on a case-by-case basis – and is
largely consistent with previous literature suggesting that complex local topography over Indonesia
can interact with the occurrence of a ‘quiescent’ weather type during ENSO events to modulate the
diurnal rainfall cycle and, accordingly, the north-south rainfall dipole over Java (Moron et al. 2015).
2.5 Discussion: Linking Predictability of Seasonal Rainfall
with Weather Index Insurance
Drawing on the observations above, it is possible to consider here a more complete picture of
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Figure 2.15: Local-scale, Indramayu Indonesia precipitation anomalies (BMG station data), conditional on warm
(red) and cold (blue) ENSO states. Light red/blue lines depict individual year warm/cold ENSO event anomalies.
Heavy red/blue lines give the mean anomalies over all warm/cold ENSO events. Solid and dashed black lines give the
neutral year average SST and standard deviations, respectively. Red and blue markers indicate seasonal warm/cold
ENSO year anomalies that are statistically different (t-test) from the neutral-year values at the 95% (square) and 90%
(triangle) levels.
how risk mitigation tools, such as weather index insurance, can be linked with seasonal forecast
information to better facilitate not only sustainable insurance products, but also adaptive decision-
making by farmers.
For example, it has been shown here that early season (SON) rainfall anomalies over Java may
be signalled locally, based on observable indicators such as previous year late season (MJJ) rainfall
deficits as well as the timing of the prior monsoon cessation. While the climate science literature
prefers to focus on underlying physical drivers of variability (such as SSTs) when assessing the
predictability of emerging climatological events, the presence of leading, locally observable in-
dicators of monsoon onset and early season (SON) rainfall are economically important, and have
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clear links to issues of adverse selection in insurance design. The insurance literature suggests well
established strategies to address such issues in insurance markets: such as (i) finalizing insurance
transactions before locally observable late season (MJJ) rainfall statistics, or monsoon cessation
timing, can be observed, or (ii) allowing insurance premiums to adjust to forecast information, as
it emerges through monsoon cessation behaviour, and dry season Niño 3.4 anomaly values. How-
ever, following Carriquiry & Osgood (2011), the implementation of these strategies might also be
tied to opportunities for farmers to adjust their productive decision making to the available infor-
mation – such as by supporting increased risk-taking in years with neutral or emerging cold ENSO
conditions through the MC dry season, or by providing for quick payouts and thus potential for
re-planting in years likely to experience delayed onset or early season rainfall deficits due to warm
ENSO events.
Further, the potential predictability of late season (Year 1) rainfall with leading (approx. SON
to FMA) Niño 3.4 anomalies (see Figure 2.11), and the differential timing of information revelation
for late as opposed to early monsoon season rainfall variability, presents additional opportunities
to facilitate adaptive decision making for farmers. For example, leveraging the seasonal crop cycle
in Java described in Boer & Kirno (2003), early and late season (or first and second crop cycle)
weather insurance products could be marketed separately, as done elsewhere (Madajewicz et al.
2014, Greatrix et al. 2015), and used to integrate and convey forecast information about each season
as it becomes available. Insurance payouts and information provision for early season (monsoon
onset) insurance could also be tailored to account for emerging information about the probability
of late season rainfall events, based on the strength of any SON-NDJ Niño 3.4 index anomalies.
While these sort of information provision or adaptive decision-making frameworks might prove
beneficial in index insurance market design, it is important to note that their implementation would
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need to incorporate local information, and consider potential constraints encountered by poor or
smallholder farmers. For instance, whether high intensity rainfall events would be beneficial (and
thus present a productive opportunity) or harmful (and thus a productive risk) for farmers is not a
priori obvious, and may depend on local conditions, including: local infrastructure, rainfall stor-
age and irrigation potential, local susceptibility to flooding, or other adaptive conditions. In such
cases, the adaptive opportunity, and information required, may differ. Similarly, if adverse se-
lection concerns suggest advancing insurance product sales prior to the previous year’s harvest to
ensure they lead locally observable indicators of emerging events, this may present challenges for
insurance uptake among smallholder farmers whose resources tend to be more constrained at this
time. For insurance transactions to be finalized before local indicators of late season rainfall or ces-
sation performance become observable, more flexible payment mechanisms may therefore need to
be considered to reduce liquidity constraints, and enable market participation.
Another important factor to consider in exploiting these seasonal linkages is that if preceding
(Yr 0) monsoon cessation is indicative of an increased likelihood of delayed monsoon onset in the
following year, this may compound the vulnerability of local populations through linked risk of
increased crop failure in consecutive seasons. This compounded risk could be built into insurance
products, which might, for instance, be designed to cover livelihood needs over this period of
increased risk, or to communicate the need to adapt decision-making in the onset period, following
a poor late season.
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2.6 Conclusion
Building from recent observations in the climate sciences literature on how the South-East Asian
monsoon and seasonal rainfall progression over the MC are coupled with variability in ENSO,
and linking these to recent advances in the economics and development literature on new financial
instruments to reduce agricultural risk in developing countries, this paper seeks to investigate po-
tential regional predictability of monsoon cessation and late season rainfall over the Island of Java,
Indonesia, with a view towards informing index insurance projects currently under development
in the region.
In this effort, it extends consideration of the predictability of regional-scale Monsoonal In-
donesian rainfall variability from a literature on delayed monsoon onset during El Niño events to
consider potential predictability of late-season (particularly MJJ) monsoon rainfall, with the aim of
better understanding: (i) forecast potential and risk in this region, and (ii) how forecast information
may be better tied with financial products, such as index insurance, to improve farmer incentives,
decision-making, and livelihoods under climate risk.
Results suggest that:
1. Late season characteristics of monsoon rainfall over Java, Indonesia, are spatially coherent,
and potentially predictable through coupling to variability in the Niño 3.4 index. Potential
predictability, linked through the examination of underlying physical processes drawn from
the literature, is shown to derive from anomalous easterlies duringwarmENSO events, which
serve to reduce climatological westerlies during the peak monsoon season, reducing evap-
oration and warming local SSTs and near-surface temperatures surrounding Java. While
previous studies have found a similarly disturbed thermodynamic equilibrium through the
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January-June period following a warm ENSO event, and linked that to disturbed patterns of
rainfall variability over Java through the January-June period (Giannini et al. 2007; Qian
et al. 2010), this study demonstrates the potential for specific coupling of anomalous late
season (MJJ) rainfall intensity and, potentially, total MJJ rainfall, to ENSO events.
2. Monsoon cessation, defined using modified definitions of agronomic onset from the litera-
ture, is not found to be significantly tied to variation in leading Niño 3.4 anomalies, suggest-
ing season length in ENSO years is determined primarily by variability in monsoon onset.
However, cessation of the preceding (Yr 0) monsoon is found to be statistically related to
emerging ENSO events, and potentially indicative of both lagged Niño 3.4 anomalies, and
the subsequent timing of monsoon onset (along with overall dry season length). Investigat-
ing these ties, local SST anomalies are found to emerge around Java with emerging ENSO
events around the leading AMJ(0) to MJJ(0) period, while regional MJJ rainfall also found
to be positively correlated with local SSTs.
3. The structure of an (index) insurancemarket in Java could be informed by these observations,
to improve market sustainability and to support farmer’s productive decision-making. First,
potential signalling of emerging ENSO events through locally observable indicators such as
the timing of the previous season monsoon cessation is economically important, and sug-
gests insurance markets will need to take account of this information in index pricing and/or
the timing of insurance sales – as well as in the design of linked agricultural risk-reduction
strategies. Secondly, the progressive revelation of information could also inform index in-
surance product design, with indicators of variability in monsoon onset emerging as early
as the leading MJJ, while indicators of late season rainfall variability may emerge later, and
are tied more directly to predictability of the strength of emerging El Niño events. This dif-
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ference in the timing of information availability could suggest, for example, that productive
decisions would be better informed through insurance contracts split to specifically target
early or late season crop cycles, or structured to allow farmers to better take advantage of
forecast information as it is revealed and/or communicated at key points through the season.
These results are suggestive about the potential to use targeted forecast information to inform
the structure and design of index insurance markets, and to improve the sustainability of index
insurance pilots and programs. Moreover, they suggest strong potential for social science applica-
tions of climate information to inform future investigations of the predictability of seasonal rainfall
patterns – to provide information that will best leverage tools to reduce productive risk and inform
productive decision-making. However, much future work remains, including: (i) from a climate
science perspective – evaluating whether existing forecast models are able to predict the late season
rainfall anomalies observed here; what level of skill (or probability of event occurrence) is poten-
tially achievable in forecasts of late season rainfall variability with these models; and whether such
models can extend the lead time on late season information provision through skillful predictions
of the strength of Niño 3.4 SON seasonal anomalies; while (ii) from a social science perspective
– developing a better understanding of how to communicate forecast information (and especially
probabilistic information) to smallholder farmers; how they will tend to use this information, if tied
with insurance or other risk-reduction instruments, in their decision-making processes; and what
level of forecast skill is needed to allow for measurable impacts on farmer decision-making, or to
achieve meaningful results for improving farmer livelihoods.
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Chapter 3
The Implications of Carbon Markets for Sustainable Boreal Forest
Management: A Complete Carbon Life-Cycle Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Given the size of Canada’s forested land base, forest carbon management could represent an im-
portant component of any Canadian domestic climate change strategy. With a total area of 242
million ha, Canada’s boreal forest ecosystem stores a vast amount of carbon: the biomass (trees)
alone stores roughly 30 times Canada’s annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, a figure which in-
creases to 241 times if carbon stored in both the biomass and soil carbon layers is counted (Anielski
and Wilson 2005). Research has shown that forest management practices have the ability to sig-
nificantly enhance the strength of forest carbon sinks and to delay or reduce emissions from forest
carbon sources (Apps et al. 2000; Metz et al. 2001). However, if forests are to make a contribution
to Canada’s domestic climate change strategy, it is critical to understand how incentives related to
carbon sequestration will affect forest management (FM) decisions and forest values.
To date, most economic analyses of forest carbon management have included only simple rep-
resentations of forest carbon stock and flux, particularly in consideration of the soil carbon pool.
Forest management (FM) activities can affect soil carbon levels in a variety of ways, some neg-
ative, and some positive; however, these effects are complex, and generally less well understood
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than the effects of FM on biomass carbon (Jandl et al. 2007). For instance, Johnson and Curtis
(2001) argue that the effects of timber harvesting techniques on soil carbon stocks are rather small
on average, and diminish over time without lasting effect. Similarly, Ter-Mikaelian et al. (2008)
argue that there is no evidence for any significant effect of forest harvesting on soil carbon stocks.
However, these arguments somewhat mask findings in other studies, summarized in Peng et al.
(2002), which indicate that soil carbon consistently decreases for 10-50 years after harvesting oc-
curs, although returning to near pre-felling values by 60-90 years. In addition, other FM options
besides harvesting, such as increasing rotation lengths, may also affect soil carbon dynamics and
may matter in terms of how soil carbon stocks build up or diminish over time (Kurz et al. 1998).
Considering the cost of soil carbon management in an economic analysis of FM options for
carbon sequestration could be an important consideration, particularly if we are to discount physical
carbon (as discussed in van Kooten 2009). Even if soil carbon returns to near pre-felling values
over time, a 10-50 year decrease following harvest could affect the timing of offset-credit flows in a
market for forest carbon. Similarly, if rotation length selection can affect soil carbon accumulation
or decline over time, then this could have significant implications for FM as the costs and benefits
of managing soil carbon may accrue in different periods. In one relevant, recent study of such
considerations, Asante et al (2010) examine the effect of variations in soil carbon on rotation age,
finding that the initial level of soil carbon can significantly affect harvesting decisions. Similarly,
Elgie et al (2011) show that jointly optimizing FM decisions to account for harvested timber as well
as carbon sequestration on the forest landscape, when including a detailed representation of soil
carbon dynamics, can have significant implications for rotation lengths, the intensity of harvesting
practices, and the area of forested land ‘preserved’ or removed from active harvest.
There is also a need to extend such economic analyses of optimal FM decisions, including
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more detailed analysis of carbon dynamics, to take into account the full life-cycle carbon balance
implications of FM. There is an ever-increasing amount of carbon stored in the forest products pool
(Upton et al. 2007), and accounting for wood products and the potential substitution of fossil fuels
(Hennigar et al. 2008, Eriksson et al. 2007, Schmid et al. 2006) as well as harvest operations and
timber transportation emissions (Dwivedi et al. 2009, Liski et al. 2001) is essential if we are to
undertake a full accounting of FM implications for the carbon balance. Several recent studies have
incorporated extended carbon balance analyses of FM; with two primary modeling frameworks
being adopted. Some studies, such as Hennigar et al. (2008) and Neilson et al. (2008), have
developed linear programming models to investigate the FM implications of adopting alternative
objective functions: such as maximizing carbon storage on the forest landscape and/or in wood
products. Other studies, including Eriksson et al. (2007) and Liski et al. (2001), have developed
simulation models to assess the effects of prescribed changes in FM on carbon stocks and life-cycle
carbon emissions.
To contribute to and synthesize these different streams of the literature, this paper will present
a full life-cycle carbon accounting framework; including landscape carbon, forest product-stored
carbon, and emissions from management, harvest and milling operations, landfill decay, and tim-
ber transport, for a representative forest management area in the boreal plains region of western
Canada. Different modeling approaches will be contrasted and compared, including: (i) approaches
similar to those in previous studies (Hennigar et al. and Neilson et al.) which attempt to maximize
timber volume produced versus carbon storage; as well as (ii) a joint optimization approach, which
maximizes returns to forest product and carbon management simultaneously. The sensitivity of
these FM decisions to different carbon accounting frameworks will be assessed, with analysis cen-
tered on how differing inclusion of alternative carbon pools/sources affects the FM decisions that
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are predicted to occur under different objective function structures.
The key innovation of the paper is the development of a linear programming model capable of
incorporating both traditional timber production, as well as the returns from a market for carbon
offset-credits, into a joint objective function while also accounting for life-cycle carbon emissions.
Flexibility in the level of detail included in the soil carbon pool allows for consideration of how
the cost of soil carbon management affects the selection of FM practices. Key insights from the
paper include a description of the linear programming model, and how alternative modelling as-
sumptions, including varying detail in life-cycle carbon accounting, may affect predicted FM prac-
tices in Canada’s boreal. Study results should therefore assist governments and firms in evaluating
research pertaining to forest carbon management, and the implications of alternative modelling
practices.
3.2 Background
Canada’s forest ecosystems have the potential to switch between net atmospheric carbon sinks and
net sources of atmospheric carbon (Kurz and Apps 1999). The balance between the absorption and
storage of carbon (mainly through tree growth) and the release of carbon from the forest (mainly
through senescence and decomposition, fire or insect events, or human disturbance) determines
whether a forest ecosystem serves as a net sink or source of carbon during any particular period.
Forest management practices can significantly affect this balance, either by enhancing the strength
of forest carbon sinks or delaying or reducing emissions from forest carbon sources (Apps et al.
2000; Metz et al. 2001).
There are two main FM strategies to enhance the amount of carbon stored within a forest. The
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first is to conserve existing carbon stocks (or delay their release), through practices such as de-
layed harvest, avoided harvest (conservation), fire or insect control, or improved soil management
(Price et al. 1997; Kurz et al. 1998; Kurz and Apps 1999; Bhatti et al. 2001; Amiro et al. 2002).
The second strategy is to increase the rate at which the forest sequesters and stores new carbon,
through intensive management practices such as tree planting, species manipulation, stand thin-
ning, or fertilization (Hoen and Solberg 1994; Sedjo and Botkin 1997; Sohngen and Mendelsohn
1998; Sampson and Scholes 2000; Lee et al. 2002). The actual effectiveness of these different
practices for increasing forest carbon will vary with a number of factors, including the initial age
class structure of the forest, species mix, and the pattern of past disturbances in a particular forest
area (Kurz and Apps 1999; Sampson and Scholes 2000; Kurz et al. 2002).
However, more recent work has suggested that focussing only on carbon stored within the for-
est and on the forest ‘landscape’ may lead to spuriously optimal management strategies, and that
any effective FM strategy for carbon sequestration must include forest product and landfill stored
carbon in addition to forest-landscape stored carbon (e.g. Hennigar et al. 2008). The amount of
carbon stored in North America from Canadian wood products has been accumulating at increasing
rates: with 16.14 Mt C per year sequestered in 1990 and 21.9 Mt C sequestered per year in 2005
(NCASI 2007), while net carbon stocks stored in Canada for the forest products sector significantly
reduce total net atmospheric carbon exchange (Apps et al. 1999). Motivated by these observations,
Hennigar et al. (2008) analyze trade offs in FM between objectives to maximize landscape and for-
est product stored carbon versus landscape carbon without the forest products pool, and find that
the inclusion of forest product stored carbon can maximize FM-based reductions in atmospheric
CO2. Other studies (Perez-Garcia et al. 2005) have argued that not only must forest product and
landfill stored carbon be accounted for, but product substitution away from more fossil-fuel inten-
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sive products must also be included in an overall analysis for FM to lead to significant reductions
in atmospheric CO2.
Nevertheless, whether any of these practices will be cost-effective in a particular location is
a question of economics. The potential to sequester carbon through FM activities is often seen
as a relatively cost-effective means of offsetting emissions from other sources; perhaps providing
time while more efficient technologies for emission abatement are developed and implemented
(Metz et al. 2001; van Kooten and Sohngen 2007). The costs of producing carbon offsets through
FM have been widely investigated (Sohngen and Mendelsohn 2003; van Kooten et al. 2004; van
Kooten and Sohngen 2007), with a summary of results indicating that the costs of forest carbon
sequestration in Canada and the US may range from a low of $2 to a high of $80/t CO2 (van
Kooten and Sohngen 2007). Such costs are also found to vary depending on the opportunity cost
of land (Metz et al. 2001) as well as regional differences in existing forest inventories (Lewis et al.
1996). Yet, most existing studies of forest-product based carbon sequestration have abstracted away
from consideration of the costs of carbon sequestration through alternative FM strategies, instead
adopting models of optimal timber production or optimal carbon sequestration, or simulations of
prescribed changes in FM practices, instead of looking at optimal returns to FM for timber, carbon,
or both jointly.
There has accordingly been little research to date on how a market for carbon will affect FM
responses by individual firms at the landscape level. Research focused on how carbon markets may
affect FM at the stand level have found that a carbon price, ceteris paribus, will tend to increase
the optimal rotation length of a managed stand – even to the point of avoiding harvest altogether
(Plantinga and Birdsey 1994; van Kooten et al. 1995; Creedy and Wurzbacher 2001). The explicit
trade-offs involved in optimizing different FM activities over a landscape have been compared;
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including the maximization of either timber or forest carbon production separately (Krcmar and
van Kooten 2005; Hennigar et al. 2008), however firms would be expected to incorporate all
potential sources of revenue into a combined FM strategy. One of the few studies to attempt to
jointly optimize returns to timber and carbon management for a forest landscape (Backeus et al.
2005) examined a limited set of forest carbon or product pools, and excluded soil carbon from their
analysis. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, no study has yet addressed the optimal landscape
level response of a firm to concurrent timber harvest and carbon management incentives, examined
from the landscape-level to a complete life-cycle assessment, using the kind of integrated approach
presented below.
3.3 Methodology
An integrated modelling framework was developed for the purposes of this research. This inte-
grated model combines an optimal timber harvest scheduling model with a carbon budget model,
in order to examine how a market price for carbon could affect firms’ FM incentives across a forest
landscape. The landscape carbon budget model is extended to account for forest product stored
carbon, product carbon in landfills and carbon decay, as well as carbon emissions from landscape
management practices, harvesting activity, milling, and transport of both logs to mill and timber
products to market. Given an initial set of ecological, economic and regulatory conditions, the
optimal harvest scheduling component is modelled in the Woodstock forest modelling package;
a package used by many firms for forest management planning (Remsoft Inc. 1998). Landscape
forest carbon dynamics are incorporated through carbon yield curves developed with the Carbon
Budget Model of the Canadian Forest Sector (CBM-CFS3; CFS 2005b). Carbon transfer and res-
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idency matrices for forest products are from Neilson et al. 2008,1 while milling emissions factors
are from NCASI (2007).2
The modelling approach approximates several of the key factors that may influence forest man-
agement decisions, given the introduction of a market price for carbon. Considerable flexibility is
built into the model, allowing for the specification of alternative prices, discount rates, and regula-
tory scenarios, while presenting a range of possible forest age, management intensity and harvest
scheduling options for implementation over the landscape. Carbon dynamics are incorporated with
a view to capturing effects specific to individual forest cover types, productivity levels, manage-
ment intensities, stand disturbance histories and harvest rotation lengths.
Rather than choosing a case study area (where the results would be specific to conditions on
that site) we opt for the use of a stylized forest with species types typical of the boreal, to allow
us to investigate the impact of a carbon market on a number of boreal forest management areas
that exist across Canada. This approach allows for the assessment of potential impacts of a carbon
market on a range of initial forest conditions and characteristics.
3.3.1 Constrained Optimization Model
For the purposes of the mathematical programming model, several different objective functions
are considered. To be consistent with the previous literature in this area, we first adopt a series
of objective functions that look to maximize certain key FM outputs, including: (i) volume of
1The decay rates in Neilson et al. are originally adapted from Apps et al. (1999) by Hennigar et al. (2008).
2The model utilized in this study is an extension of the one employed in McCarney et al. (2008) and Elgie et
al. (2011). Key improvements to the model include the addition of forest product carbon, landfill stored carbon, and
secondary carbon emissions into the carbon accounting model. Note also that improvements have been made to the
CBM-CFS3 since these previous studies, and all carbon yield curves in this paper have been updated to be consistent
the CBM-CFS3 v.2
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timber harvested; (ii) forest landscape (i.e. on-site) carbon storage; (iii) forest landscape carbon
plus carbon stored in forest products and landfills; (iv) the discounted quantity of carbon stored
on the forest landscape; and (v) the discounted quantity of carbon stored on the forest landscape
plus forest products and landfill-stored carbon. These model scenarios allow us to compare the
output of our model with results from other studies in the literature. The objective functions can
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Xijk = Area (ha) of development type i born in period j and harvested in period k.
Riahk = Area (ha) of development type i from initial age-class a and disturbance history h
standing at the beginning of period k.
!ijk = Hardwood merchantable volume (m3/ha) associated with development type i born in
period j and harvested in period k.
ijk = Softwood merchantable volume (m3/ha) associated with development type i born in
period j and harvested in period k.
sijk =Carbon storage factor (tonnes/m3) inwood products of harvested, merchantable biomass,
of timber type s 2 f!; g, for development type i, born in period j and harvested in period k.
ziahk = Total carbon stock (tonnes/ha) associated with development type i of initial age-class a
and disturbance history h at time period k.
ris = Permanent carbon residency factor (%) for wood product stored carbon in products made
from wood type s 2 f!; g.
uist = Carbon residency factor (%) for carbon stored in wood products t years after harvest, but
which will eventually be released in T years or less as wood products decay.
Ai = Age (in periods) of the oldest age-class present for development type i in period one.
pi = The number of periods required for development type i to meet the minimum harvest
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standard regulation (for Alberta, this is 47.5m3/ha).
 = discount factor (here, assumed to be 5%).
Development types are a particularly important construct in this modelling framework, and
refer to an area of forest that follows a particular set of yield and cost curves. Yield and cost curves
are assigned on the basis of; cover type, site productivity class, distance to mill (based on haul
zones), and management/silvicultural intensity.
Following these initial model assessments, we alter the structure of the objective function to
instead assume that the objective of the forest manager is to maximize the combined net present
value (NPV) of timber harvest and carbon credits produced for the firm, rather than maximizing a
particular forest output. Four additional scenarios are developed under this assumption, including
maximizing: (vi) the NPV of timber harvest; (vii) the NPV of timber harvest plus forest landscape-
generated (i.e. on-site) carbon credit-offsets; (viii) the NPV of timber harvest plus forest landscape
and wood product (including landfill) generated carbon credit-offsets; and (ix) the NPV of tim-
ber harvest plus a more complete life-cycle assessment of carbon credit-offsets, including forest
landscape carbon, wood product (and landfill) stored carbon, as well as deductions for secondary
emissions from harvesting and management activities, milling operations, and transport of logs
to the mill and wood products to market. A final scenario is also developed to extend scenario
(ix) above to include credit-offsets for product substitution benefits of forest products. Again, the
formal specification of these objective functions follows:
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k   SLbk ) + qp(SPk   SPbk )
i (3.8)
Maximize the NPV of Timber Harvest plus a more Complete Life-Cycle Assessment (including
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(SPk   SPbk ) + (SEbk   SEk )
ii (3.9)
Maximize the NPV of Timber Harvest plus a more Complete Life-Cycle Assessment, including
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yijk = Revenue ($/ha) associated with timber from development type i, born in period j and
harvested in period k.
CHijk = Harvesting cost ($/ha) associated with clear cut harvesting development type i which
is born in period j and harvested in period k. Includes both the direct costs of harvesting and the
crown timber dues rate.
CDijk = Transportation/Hauling cost ($/ha) associated with removing timber from development
type i, born in period j and harvested in period k. This is scaled by haul zone distance factors
D 2 f100km; 200km; 350kmg haul zones, specific to development type i.
CRmi = Regeneration costs ($/ha) associated with development type i when management inten-
sitym is prescribed.
Xmijk = Area (ha) of development type i born in period j, harvested in period k, and prescribed
to management intensitym after harvest.
M = the set of available management/silvicultural intensities {leave for natural, basic, inten-
sive}, with associated costs.
qt = Market price of a temporary carbon credit ($/tonne).







































SAk =  ijkXijk
for
m = the emission factor (tC/ha) for silviculture/management intensitym 2M .
 = the emission factor (tC/ha) for clearcut harvesting.
 = the emission factor (tC/m3/km) for log transport to mill.
 i = the distance scaling factor for transport to mill from the haul zone for development type i.
s = the emission factor (tC/m3) for milling lumber type s 2 f!; g.
s = the emission factor (tC/m3) for transporting wood products produced by lumber type
s 2 f!; g from the mill to the marketplace.
 = the avoided emissions factor (tC/m3) for produced softwood lumber/sawlogs.






k are the corresponding carbon accounting values for the baseline
(or business-as-usual) scenario.
Given an initial age-class structure, the Woodstock forest modelling package is utilized to
develop optimal harvest schedules for each of the ten model scenarios described above. A de-
tailed account of forest carbon balance is incorporated into this analysis (as described below). For
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landscape-stored carbon, carbon credit-offsets are assumed to be of temporary (as opposed to per-
manent) value. The use of temporary carbon credits for forest landscape carbon implies that the
excess (deficit) carbon stored in each period, as compared to that period’s baseline carbon stock,
generates a credit (debit) according to the market value of carbon. Carbon credit-offsets gener-
ated in the forest products sector, and secondary emissions from milling, harvesting, and transport
activities are assumed to be of permanent (as opposed to temporary) value. The implications of
assuming temporary versus permanent carbon-offset values is discussed in greater detail below.
The model is structured as a Model B forest harvest scheduling model similar to that described
by Garcia (1990), and is applied to an aggregate representation of a forest that includes a number
of forest stand types and age-classes (i.e. a forest landscape). Management activity is studied in
discrete ten-year periods over a planning horizon of 200 years. Several constraints are enforced
on the objective function. Area constraints ensure that all of the forest area is either assigned to a
harvest action or left as standing inventory at the end of the planning horizon:
NX
k=1






Xijk = 0 8i; k (3.11b)
where Rij is the area (ha) of forest type i which was regenerated in period j; and Wij is the
area (ha) of forest type i which was regenerated in period j and left as ending inventory at the end
of the planning horizon.















Fk   Fk+1 = 0 8k (3.12c)
Gk  Gk+1 = 0 8k (3.12d)
where Fk and Gk are the softwood and hardwood volumes (m3), respectively, harvested in
period k. Non-negativity constraints also apply to all management activities undertaken on the
landscape. This modelling approach has been chosen, in part, because it builds on an approach that
is relatively common in forest industry practice today.3
For model scenarios including carbon credit-offset values in the objective function, baseline
carbon stocks are generated through a preliminary model run which tracks carbon stock levels
while assuming that forest managers operate to maximize the NPV of timber harvesting alone over
the landscape (subject to the given constraints). This is equivalent to tracking the resulting carbon
stock levels in model scenario (vi) described above, and approximates a ‘business-as-usual’ (BAU)
approach to carbon baseline derivation.
It should be noted that the effects of fire are not incorporated into the model, as the explicit
3For a more detailed explanation of the constrained optimization model, including the mathematical specification
of inventory and carbon accounting rows, and details pertaining to the growth and yield curves assumed, and the carbon
yield curve structures, see McCarney (2007).
106
inclusion of fire is beyond the capabilities of this modelling approach and rules regarding carbon
liability for fire are presently unclear. The impact of fire and/or the implications for the develop-
ment of insurance schemes to address fire could be large, however, and should be the subject of
future study.
3.3.2 Forest Landscape Structure and Forest Management Assumptions
Species mix and growth and yield characteristics are meant to be representative of the boreal plains
region of western Canada (see Figure 3.1) and are based on data provided by Daishowa-Marubeni
International Ltd. (DMI) for part of their Forest Management Agreement area in North-Central Al-
berta, Canada. Five separate forest cover types are modeled; aspen-leading cover, aspen and white
spruce mixedwood cover, white spruce-leading cover, pine-leading cover, and mixed coniferous
cover, with each particular species type assigned to an equal area of an assumed 900,000 ha forest
management area. A fully regulated normal forest is assumed as the initial age-class distribution
for all model scenarios, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, with each species type equally distributed across
initial age-class groupings.
The firm’s management regime is assumed to consist of two options: (i) adjusting the harvest
schedule, and (ii) applying different silvicultural intensities following harvest. The optimal tim-
ing and combination of these management practices over the forest landscape is determined via
the linear programming model, and is dependent on the cost of implementing each alternative as
well as the regulatory regime imposed. The harvest schedule is assumed to consist of only clearcut
management options. Economic rents accruing through timber harvest are based on mill gate tim-
ber values (net of stumpage dues) of $40/m3 for both softwood and hardwood, minus all costs
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Figure 3.1: The Boreal Plains Ecosystem
of logging to roadside ($13/m3), loading ($1.50/m3) and access/road costs ($2.50/m3) as derived
for Alberta by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005). Hauling costs of $7/m3, $14/m3, and $24.50/m3
respectively for close (100km), mid-distance (200km) and far (350km) haul zones are also incor-
porated into the model, and are based on data from the Alberta Logging Cost Survey (Kuhnke et al.
2002). Silvicultural options, meanwhile, are based on those described by Insley et al. (2002) and
lead to adjustments in growth and yield trajectories. These include leave for natural (or extensive)
regeneration ($5/ha), a basic site preparation and planting regime ($930/ha) and a more intensive
regime including additional cultivation and herbicide treatments ($1180/ha). All costs are appro-
priately inflated to current values using the raw materials price index. For interested readers, more
detailed descriptions of all case study data and assumptions are available in McCarney (2007).
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Figure 3.2: Initial Age-Class Structure of the Fully Regulated Normal Forest
3.3.3 Carbon Modelling Procedure
An attempt is made in this study to incorporate a rigorous and realistic depiction of forest carbon
dynamics throughout the planning horizon. Our approach is based on the recognition that stand
level forest carbon stocks can be divided into two major pools; forest biomass (both aboveground
and belowground) and dead organic matter (including detritus and soil organic matter).
Using the Carbon Budget Model of the Canadian Forest Sector (CBM-CFS3), separate biomass
and DOM carbon yield curves are developed for implementation in the constrained optimization
model. The carbon yield curves capture carbon dynamics specific to individual forest cover types,
stand age at time of harvest and the number of harvest events (or disturbance history) for a given
stand. Through the integration of these yield curves into the optimization model, it is possible
to capture the content of biomass and DOM carbon pools, on-site carbon growth and decomposi-
tion rates and carbon transfers from biomass to DOM. For further detail relating to the techniques
adopted to develop and integrate carbon yield curves specific to each stand’s disturbance history,
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Figure 3.3: Carbon Residency and Decay Curves (obtained from Neilson et al. 2008)
see McCarney (2007).
Forest product carbon transfer matrices are based on those used in Hennigar et al. (2008), which
are in turn derived from Apps et al. (1999). Carbon residency in forest product (and landfill) pools
is based on decay rates from Neilson et al. (2008) (see Figure 3.3 for carbon residence curves).
To simplify the analysis, 100% of softwood harvested is assumed transferred for softwood lumber
production, while 100% of hardwood volume is assumed transferred to the pulp and paper sector.
As in Hennigar et al. (2008), carbon in merchantable wood products was accounted for through
direct conversion of merchantable volume to tonnes of carbon delivered to the mill. The tonnes (t)
of merchantable carbon per ha for each species type (s), either hardwood or softwood, allocated to




vsgs  0:5 (3.13)
where v is merchantablem3ha 1 multiplied by green wood specific gravity values g for species
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Table 3.1: Secondary Emissions Factors Assumed in Carbon Accounting Framework
Emissions Factors (EF)
Silviculture/Stand Management EF
LFN Management 0.0 tC/ha
Basic Management 0.0005174 tC/ha
Intensive Management 0.00057 tC/ha
Logging EF
Clearcut Harvesting 0.002195 tC/ha
Transport to Mill EF
Hardwood Log Transport 0.0000245 tC/m3/ha
Softwood Log Transport 0.0000245 tC/m3/ha
Milling EF
Hardwood Pulp/Chips 0.307816 tC/m3
Softwood Lumber/Sawlogs 0.010672 tC/m3
Transport to Market EF
Lumber/Paper Transport to Market 0.000067 tC/m3
s, obtained from Panshin and de Zeeuw (1980).4 The resulting kg of merchantable dry biomass per
ha value is then multiplied by 0.5 tonnes of carbon per kg of dry biomass (IPCC 2003) to obtain
the tonnes of carbon per ha of merchantable timber harvested for species s.
Secondary emissions factors adopted herein are summarized in Table 3.1, and include emissions
occurring from silvicutlure and stand management activities, emissions from logging and transport
of harvested timber to the mill gate, milling emissions, and emissions from the transport of forest
products from the mill to market. Finally, in certain scenarios, product substitution emissions fac-
tors are also accounted for. We adopt here the same range of avoided emissions factors tested in
Hennigar et al. (2008): 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, and 1.0 tonnes of carbon per cubic metre.
For a graphical depiction of the forest product sector and secondary emissions carbon account-
ing framework utilized in this paper, see Figure 3.4.
4The relevant values are 0.35 for hardwood (aspen) and 0.36 for softwood (spruce) (Panshin and de Zeeuw 1980).
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Figure 3.4: Summary of Lifecycle Carbon Accounting Framework
3.3.4 Carbon Pricing and Discount Rates
A key issue pertaining to carbon credit pricing concerns the permanence of carbon offsets. For
forest offsets, unlike other types of offset projects (which involve fossil fuel reduction), there is
a risk that the sequestered carbon could later be released through a disturbance event. This risk
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must be addressed if forest offsets are to be traded in carbon markets based on permanent carbon
reductions. There are several possible approaches to address this impermanence risk for purposes
of offset markets. To avoid questions of who, in the case of unplanned forest carbon losses, would
be required to compensate the purchaser of a carbon credit, Sedjo (2001) argues that forest carbon
offsets should be defined as temporary, as opposed to permanent, carbon credits.
In this study, forest carbon offsets stored on-site (on the forest landscape) are modeled as tem-
porary carbon credits. The duration of these temporary credits is one model period (equivalent to
10 years). Since temporary credit purchasers assume the risk of renewing credits at future market
prices, the value of these 10-year temporary carbon credits is (and must be) discounted compared
to that of permanent credit offsets (Chomitz and Lecocq 2003; van Kooten 2007). Although the
appropriate size of the discount remains uncertain, van Kooten (2007) has developed a set of pa-
rameters which can assist in converting temporary to permanent credit values. The parameters
proposed by van Kooten (2007) have therefore been used to format conversion tables (see Table
3.2) – which present a range of credit values while using time-discount rates of 3%, 5%, and 7%
to reflect the range of discount rates currently debated in the literature.
Meanwhile, all forest product stored carbon, carbon release from landfill decay, secondary
carbon emissions due to logging, milling, and transportation activities, and avoided emissions from
product substitution are valued in this study as permanent carbon offsets. Doing so necessitated
the selection of a particular conversion rate between temporary and permanent carbon credits, and
the conversion factor characteristic of a 5% discount rate, 0.02 growth rate of the shadow price of
carbon, and N (or assumed duration of permanent carbon reductions) of 200 years were selected
from the range of possible values presented in Table 3.2. Futurework should examine the sensitivity
of the forest carbon management results derived herein to different conversion factor assumptions
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Table 3.2: Value of a 10-Year Temporary Carbon Credit ($/t C) to a Permanent Carbon Credit ($/t CO2e)
Note 1: Based on conversion parameters (and format) in van Kooten (2007).
between the value of temporary and permanent carbon credits. The selection of the 5% discount
rate case is consistent with the 5% rate of discount assumed throughout this paper.
The range of carbon prices examined herein is intended to cover existing and near-future market
and regulatory conditions. This study utilizes a range of 10-year temporary credit prices from $1/t
C through $25/t C. An understanding of how this range of temporary credit prices is converted
from and corresponds to the permanent $/t CO2e prices discussed above (which are more common
in the literature) can be derived from Table 3.2. Note that a factor of 3.6667 is used to convert units
of carbon into units of CO2e.
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3.4 Results
This paper seeks to assess how a market for carbon will affect FM decisions in Canada’s boreal
plains region under a variety of different assumed objective functions for the forestry firm. In
the first subsection below, we investigate how a firm seeking to maximize particular quantities
of physical outputs from the forest, including: (i) timber volume harvested; (ii) forest landscape
carbon sequestered; (iii) forest plus wood product stored carbon; (iv) discounted forest landscape
carbon; and (v) discounted forest landscape plus wood product stored carbon, will adjust their FM
practices, including harvest rates, species selection for harvest, and conservation of forest areas
(i.e. areas kept free from harvest activity).
Analysis in the following subsections will consider various aspects of a firm’s FM decisions
when their assumed objective is to maximize the net present value (NPV) of the management area;
where the NPV of management includes: (i) returns to timber harvest only; (ii) returns to timber
plus forest landscape stored carbon; (iii) returns to timber plus forest landscape and wood product
stored carbon; and (iv) returns to timber plus forest landscape and wood product stored carbon,
minus any indirect, or secondary emissions associated with wood product production. These sce-
narios test a range of carbon prices, and describe how the potential to earn valuable carbon credits
in addition to harvest revenue is found to affect FM decisions such as harvest area, harvest volume,
mix of species harvested, and silvicultural intensity, as well as the overall economic value of the
forest to the firm.
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Table 3.3: Results when Maximizing the Production of Specific Forest Management Outputs
3.4.1 Optimizing the Quantity of Specific FM Outputs
This first section presents the findings from evaluating different objective functions and manage-
ment strategies that maximize particular physical quantity outputs related to FM activity. Table 3.3
summarizes the results. The first two columns of Table 3.3 show findings quite similar to those ob-
tained by others in the literature. Maximizing timber volume produced from the landscape reduces
forest landscape stored carbon levels, but increases the amount of carbon stored in wood product
pools – with both effects due to increases in mean harvest levels by the firm under this objective
function. Maximizing forest landscape stored carbon, meanwhile, has the opposite effect; reducing
mean harvest levels versus those that maximize harvest volumes, while increasing forest carbon
stocks and reducing wood product carbon storage rates.
Including both forest landscape and wood product stored carbon (less carbon emitted from
landfill decay) in the maximand reduces forest carbon stocks, but increases wood product stored
carbon versus maximizing forest landscape carbon alone – so that the overall mean quantity of
carbon stored per hectare per year remains nearly equivalent across these two scenarios. Switching
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to focus on discounted quantities of carbon stored, however, is found to have a dramatic effect on
FM strategies, with the firm’s optimal strategy being to cease all harvest activity over the landscape,
regardless of whether wood product stored carbon is included in the objective function or not. In
this case, the decrease in sequestered/stored carbon following harvest is weighted more heavily,
so that future biomass growth and carbon sequestration is not sufficient to make up for the loss of
stored carbon from harvest in earlier periods (due to the discount factor).
The third column of Table 3.3 adds what the mean changes in secondary emissions per hectare
per year associated with forest management activity under the specified objective function were –
or, in other words, it provides the quantity of additional carbon released as secondary emissions
under the FM strategy adopted by the firm to meet its specified objective. From this column, it
is apparent that if a more complete approach is taken to carbon accounting for FM, then activities
associates with higher mean harvest levels also produce higher levels of secondary emissions.
The column in Table 3.3 titled “Total Carbon” adjusts the carbon accounting measures here for
the secondary emissions produced – providing the sum of the mean tonnes of carbon per hectare per
year sequestered as forest landscape carbon and wood product stored carbon, but also subtracting
the secondary emissions produced as a result of management activity from this total. The implica-
tions are clear: adjustment for secondary emissions reduces the level of carbon sequestered when
maximizing both forest landscape and wood product stored carbon versus maximizing landscape-
stored carbon alone – so that total carbon sequestered when optimizing both forest and wood prod-
uct carbon falls from being approximately equal to that stored when optimizing forest landscape
carbon alone to being about 3% per hectare per year less. Taking these observations into account
suggests that inclusion of secondary emissions in a more complete forest carbon management ac-
counting framework could have significant implications FM decisions, as well as for policies de-
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Figure 3.5: Total Proportionate Change in Carbon Sequestered for Different Objectives when Maximizing Specific
Forest Management Outputs
signed to meet specific carbon sequestration objectives.
Finally, Table 3.3 suggests that objective functions to maximize carbon storage versus har-
vest volume could have significant implications for the structure of the managed forest landscape.
Objectives to maximize carbon storage dramatically increase the area of ‘conserved’ (or never ac-
cessed for harvest) forest versus maximizing timber harvest, from zero percent of the FM area con-
served to greater than three quarters of the FM area conserved (regardless of the specific form of the
carbon accounting objective). Maximizing carbon storage also reduces the percentage of softwood
harvested from the landscape, leading to a more even distribution of harvest activity between hard-
wood and softwood species. This second observation reflects that while softwood species can grow
larger that hardwood in the boreal plains, providing more m3 of timber per hectare harvested, this
feature also makes them more attractive under carbon maximization objectives to leave standing
on the landscape (as a store of biomass carbon). In addition, hardwood species tend to regenerate
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Figure 3.6: Total Periodic Harvest Volume over the Planning Horizon, across objectives to maximize specific FM
outputs
faster following harvest, so they will return biomass carbon to the landscape more quickly than
softwood species after a harvest event.
Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 illustrate the findings described here for each objective function con-
sidered, including: Figure 3.5 – total forest carbon sequestered (adjusted for secondary emissions
produced); Figure 3.6 – harvested volume by model period; and Figure 3.7 – the percentage of the
FM area left unaccessed (or conserved) through the planning horizon.
3.4.2 Optimizing the Net Present Value of FM Activity
If incentives for carbon management are provided to forestry firms by means of a carbon mar-
ket, instead of regulatory requirements to meet a specific carbon sequestration objective, then it
is unlikely that FM firms will respond by altering their behaviour in the ways suggested by the
preceding subsection. For example, Figure 3.8 illustrates the difference in mean harvest volume
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Figure 3.7: Proportion of FMArea Conserved (i.e. never harvested), under different objectives to maximize specific
FM outputs
per period between a firm following an objective to maximize the volume of timber harvested from
our hypothetical boreal plans landscape, versus a firm following the objective of maximizing the
net present value (NPV), or discounted returns, to managing the same landscape. As is apparent,
these two strategies provide incentives for substantively different behaviours.
In this section, we look at the expected response of a FM firm to incentives for carbon man-
agement provided through a carbon market, instead of through a target of maximizing tonnes of
sequestered carbon. Returns to carbon management in this case are defined as the value of carbon
credits; where a credit is obtained for each tonne of carbon sequestered on the forest landscape, or
in wood products, or alternatively for each tonne of CO2 emissions avoided, versus a pre-defined
baseline case. The baseline here is defined as the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario of the FM firm
seeking to maximize the NPV of timber production alone.
In each scenario in this section, the FM firm is assumed to continue to seek to maximize returns
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Figure 3.8: Total Periodic Harvested Volume when Maximizing Harvested Volume vs. Maximizing Returns to
Timber Production
to timber management from the FM area. However, different carbon accounting frameworks are
added to the firm’s objective, to investigate the expected response of the firm to carbonmarkets with
different structures. These revised objective functions are referred to as ‘objective 1’, ‘objective
2’, and ‘objective 3’ throughout the rest of this paper, with definitions as follows:
• Objective 1: Maximize the NPV of returns to timber production and the production of forest
carbon credits (i.e. credits from carbon sequestered on the forested landscape).
• Objective 2: Maximize the NPV of returns to timber production and the production of both
forest carbon and wood-product (WP) stored carbon credits, minus carbon debits from the
WP carbon pool to account for decay from landfill.
• Objective 3: Maximize the NPV of returns to timber production and a more complete ‘life-
cycle’ carbon credit accounting framework. Here, we define ‘lifecycle’ carbon accounting
as the measurement of carbon credits/debits from the production of both forest carbon and
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WP stored carbon credits, minus decay from the WP carbon pool in landfills and adjusted
also for changes in secondary carbon emission levels in the wood production process.
The Net Present Value of FM
The first question addressed is how the introduction of a carbon market affects the NPV of FM
activities on the boreal forest landscape. In a similar study, Elgie et al. (2011) showed that the per-
centage change in NPV from managing the boreal forest for both timber production and returns to
forest landscape stored carbon (i.e. our objective 1), as opposed to managing for timber production
only, was positive across a range of discount rates and initial forest age-structures. Here, we look
at the implications of different carbon accounting frameworks, including both WP carbon and a
more complete lifecycle carbon accounting approach, and present them in comparison to a similar
objective as considered in Elgie et al.
Figure 3.9 presents our initial findings, describing the percentage change in the NPV of FM to
the firm when following objectives 1, 2, and 3, versus the baseline objective of maximizing the
NPV of timber production only. As in Elgie et al., for our normal forest structure and assumed 5%
discount rate, we see an unambiguously positive effect of a carbon market, across a range of carbon
prices, on the NPV of FM to the firm. However, the magnitude of the effect of a carbon market
differs depending on the carbon accounting framework considered. Interestingly, despite the fact
that we illustrated in Table 3.3 a similar potential for total carbon sequestration when maximizing
forest landscape stored carbon versus forest plus WP stored carbon, we find here that changing the
objective function to focus on the NPV of FM produces different results. The focus on NPV of FM
illustrates the potential for a firm to obtain a greater percentage change in economic returns if a
carbon market includes only forest landscape carbon credits. The percentage change in the NPV of
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Figure 3.9: Percentage Change in the NPV of Forest Management to the Firm
FM is approximately 50 percentage points lower at $15/t CO2e, and 100 percentage points lower
at $25/t CO2e permanent credit values when an accounting of WP carbon credits is included in the
firm’s objective function, vs. accounting of forest carbon credits only.
Meanwhile, we find somewhat opposite results when our carbon accounting framework in-
cludes a more complete life-cycle carbon assessment. Accounting for bothWP carbon and changes
in secondary emissions in addition to forest carbon allows the firm to increase its economic returns
to FM, versus both objective 1 and objective 2. Most interesting is that the addition of secondary
emissions reverses the direction of change found when adding WP carbon to the objective function
above, so that the percentage change in the NPV of FM is now above that obtained when carbon
accounting includes only forest carbon, and a full 100 percentage points greater at $15/t CO2e and
200 percentage points greater at $25/t CO2e permanent credit values than the framework including
both forest carbon and WP carbon credits.
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Figure 3.10: Marginal Cost of a Carbon Market for Timber Production
Implications for Timber Supply
To begin to understand the changes in the NPV of FM when carbon credit accounting is added to
a FM firm’s objective function, we look here at how mean timber harvest rates and the returns to
timber harvest change under our three different objective functions. Recall that in all three cases,
the objective function explicitly includes the sum of returns to timber and carbon credit production,
so the firm will only be expected to reduce timber harvest if the benefits of producing additional
carbon credits on the forest landscape through lower harvest rates outweigh the costs of sending
less timber to the mill for wood product production.
We see in Figure 3.10 the implications of our different carbon accounting frameworks for the
value of timber production. Figure 3.10 describes themarginal cost for timber markets, or reduction
in the NPV of timber produced, following the introduction of carbon management incentives into
the FM firm’s objective function. The most obvious first impression from Figure 3.10 is that in
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Figure 3.11: Mean Periodic Harvest Volumes
all cases, for all three objective functions, the introduction of incentives for carbon credit supply
reduces the incentive for the firm to harvest and supply timber to the mill. Even when the applied
carbon accounting framework includes credits for WP stored carbon, we still find that the firm
is expected to reduce timber supply versus the baseline case. Meanwhile, the greatest reduction
in timber supply, at each carbon price considered, comes from objective 3 (which includes the
more complete lifecycle carbon accounting framework), and not from objective 1 (which includes
incentives for only forest landscape stored carbon).
In general, we find that a FM firm is expected to reduce timber supply more quickly as carbon
prices increase when faced with objective 3, and most slowly when faced with objective 2: with
a 50% decrease versus baseline harvest levels coming at a carbon price of $7, $9, and $13/t CO2e
permanent credit value, and a complete cessation of harvest activity realized at a carbon price of
$15, $19, and $25/t CO2e permanent credit value for objectives 3, 2, and 1 respectively.
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Figure 3.11 shows the implications of these observations for mean timber harvest levels over the
planning horizon. Timber harvest levels gradually decrease for all three NPV objective functions
as carbon prices rise, more quickly for objective 3 (including lifecycle carbon accounting), and
more slowly for objective 2 (including forest and WP stored carbon). Interestingly, at all carbon
prices, timber harvest levels remain well below those obtained when the objective was to maximize
total harvested volume, and even eventually fall below the minimal harvest levels that were found
to maximize total carbon sequestration over the planning horizon.
Finally, the composition of harvested timber is also found to change under the three carbon
market frameworks considered. Figure 3.12 shows that under objective 1, softwood is expected to
decrease as a proportion of overall timber supply as carbon prices rise – reflecting that softwood
species contain relatively greater volumes of biomass per hectare and regenerate more slowly than
hardwood species. Softwood, therefore, is relatively more valuable to conserve on the landscape
when only receiving credit for forest-based carbon. Under objective 2, however, we find that the
proportion of softwood in timber supply is expected to remain relatively more consistent across
carbon price levels (except at the extreme upper end of prices considered). This switch again
reflects the higher biomass component of softwood per hectare, and the lower decay factor of
softwood lumber (versus the pulp and paper produced from hardwood species) – which now make
softwood more appealing for harvest when WP-stored carbon is considered. The proportion of
softwood in harvested timber supply is finally found to increase sharply as carbon prices rise with
a full life-cycle accounting approach, reflecting that the milling of hardwood pulpwood has a much
higher secondary emissions factor (0.308 t C/m3) than the milling of softwood lumber (0.011 t C/
m3).
126
Figure 3.12: Average Percentage of Softwood in Sustained Yield Harvest Level
Investigating the Sources of Carbon Supply
It is important to recall when interpreting the figures on timber supply presented above, that these
reductions in timber supply are undertaken as part of an overall FM strategy which increases the
NPV of FM to the firm. Accordingly, reduced revenues from timber production must be offset
from increasing returns to carbon management. In this section, we investigate the supply of carbon
credits, and how the composition of carbon credits among the different carbon pools/emission
sources changes under the different objective functions considered.
Figure 3.13 displays the percentage of the overall NPV of FM (including both timber production
revenues and carbon credit values) that can be attributed to carbon credit production from different
carbon pools/sources. The solid back line presents the percentage of forest landscape carbon credits
in the overall NPV of FM from objective 1. Forest landscape carbon credits increase as an overall
percentage of forest revenue in this case as carbon prices rise, until they make up 100% of overall
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Figure 3.13: Percentage of Total Forest Management NPV Attributable to Specific Carbon Credit Types (by Pool)
returns to FM at a carbon price of $19/t CO2e. The dashed lines, meanwhile, show the allocation
of value between forest landscape carbon credits and WP stored carbon credits under objective
2. Interestingly, we find that while forest landscape carbon credits again make up an increasing
proportion of overall returns to FM as carbon price increases (just slightly less than under objective
1 at lower carbon prices), the firm actually experiences carbon debits due to the introduction of WP
carbon into the accounting framework. At higher carbon values, greater that 100% of FM value
comes from forest landscape carbon credits, to compensate for the debits realized in the WP sector.
A similar picture emerges with objective 3 (solid lines with triangle markers); except now both
forest landscape carbon credits and offsets for reduced secondary emissions together compensate
for debits from the WP carbon sector.
Interpreting these results requires thinking about how carbon credits are calculated. A firm
earns a forest landscape carbon credit when it sequesters additional carbon on the forest site above
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Figure 3.14: Secondary Emissions Credits (tonnes C) by Source for Objective 3: Max NPV of Timber + Lifecycle
Carbon Credits
that which would have been sequestered in the BAU scenario. Most strategies for the firm to do
so include reducing harvest activity, or delaying harvest to keep carbon in the forest longer than in
the BAU case. However, delaying or reducing harvest to produce forest landscape carbon credits
reduces the volume of timber sent to the WP sector, and so reduces the amount of carbon stored in
wood products versus that in the BAU scenario – creating carbon debits. In the lifecycle analysis,
the carbon debits produced by reducing the flow of timber to the wood product sector are offset by a
reduced production of secondary carbon emissions from lumber harvesting, transport, and milling
activity, earning addition carbon credits for the firm.
An interesting feature of Figure 3.13 is the size of credits obtained through reduced secondary
emissions under objective 3, versus the size of debits for reduced carbon stocks sent to the WP
sector. To further investigate this result, Figure 3.14 presents the allocation of secondary emission
offsets by emission source, including silvicultural emissions, logging emissions, transportation-
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related emissions (both from the forest to the mill, and from the mill to market), and also milling-
related emissions. What can be observed is that milling emissions dominate the secondary emis-
sions profile of the FM firm in this analysis, so that reducing milling activity makes a substantial
contribution to the firm’s carbon accounts. Note when interpreting Figure 3.14 that the vertical
axis is presented in a log-scale, to facilitate inclusion of each of these measures on the same graph.
In general, the results in Figures 3.13 and 3.14 indicate that given the assumptions here, the po-
tential value of carbon credits that can be obtained from reducing harvest activity and sequestering
additional carbon on the boreal forest landscape (and also through reduced secondary emissions)
outweigh the debits incurred by sending less carbon to be sequestered in the wood product sector,
and the associated reduction in timber production revenues.
3.4.3 Implications of Including Avoided Emissions from Product
Substitution in the Carbon Accounting Framework
Several existing studies in the literature have looked at the implications of including avoided
emissions from product substitution in assessments of forest carbon management and/or green-
house gas emissions profiles of the construction sector (e.g. Hennigar et al. 2008; Upton et al.
2008; Perez-Garcia et al. 2005). These assessments are motivated by the observation that for-
est products compete in the market with alternative products that often have very different carbon
accounting profiles. It is currently unclear, however, how avoided emissions due to product sub-
stitution should be included in any carbon accounting framework. For example, the substitution
effects related to construction materials are only one of many possible product substitution sce-
narios that might be related to the use of forest products; with other substitution cases possibly
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resulting in avoidable emissions due to the use of forest products (NCASI 2007). Moreover, it is
unclear even if there are demonstrable avoided emissions due to the use of forest products that the
credits generated by product substitution should be allocated to the forestry firm, instead of other
decision-makers in the sector under consideration (e.g. the construction firm, or home-buyer).
Despite these reservations, we include below a simple assessment of how credits for avoided
emissions through product substitution might impact upon the returns to FM and the FM decisions
made over the boreal forest landscape, should they accrue to the forestry firm. Our motivation for
including this section is primarily to compare our results with other studies in the literature, and
as a sensitivity test to see how credits for avoided emissions might impact our earlier findings. It
should not be considered an endorsement of the inclusion of credits for avoided emissions from
product substitution in any carbon accounting framework for forestry firms in Canada.
To assess the inclusion of avoided emissions from product substitution in our FM model, we
adopt the same substitution rates (tonnes of carbon emissions avoided per m3 of lumber product)
used in Hennigar et al. (2008); who base their set of substitution rates on other studies in the
literature (including Perez-Garcia 2005; Petersen and Solberg 2003; and Lippke and Edmonds
2006). Hennigar et al (2008) find that substitution rates used in the literature are variable and
depend on a number of specific assumptions about the forest products market and its carbon profile,
and so test a range of production substitution rates, including: 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, and 1 t C/m3. We
refer to these rates below as avoided emissions scenarios AE1, AE2, AE3, and AE4, respectively.
It is important to note that we consider avoided emissions from product substitution only for
softwood lumber, as under our model assumptions all hardwood harvested goes to the pulp and
paper sector. Also, in all cases, we look at avoided emissions scenarios as an addition to our
objective function specification number three: the specification including timber production as
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Figure 3.15: Percentage Change in NPV of Forest Management: Including Avoided Emissions from Product Sub-
stitution
well as the more complete lifecycle analysis of carbon sequestration (including forest carbon and
WP carbon credits as well as offsets for secondary carbon emissions).
Figure 3.15 shows the implications of our different avoided emission factor assumptions on the
NPV of FM for our boreal plains landscape. The NPV of FM when including product substitution
at rates of AE1 through AE3 produces very little change in the NPV of FM, when added on to and
compared with our earlier objective function 3: maximizing the NPV of timber production plus
lifecycle carbon accounting. Only when the assumed product substitution rate reaches AE4 (1 t
C/m3) do we observe an appreciable increase in the NPV of FM versus the objective function 3
scenario without inclusion of an avoided emissions factor.
Figure 3.16 zooms in on the results from Figure 3.15, to try and improve our understanding of
the results obtained. Here, we look instead at the percentage change in the NPV of FMwith avoided
emissions included versus our objective function 3 without an avoided emissions factor. We find
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Figure 3.16: Percentage Change in NPV of Forest Management including Avoided Emissions from Product Substi-
tution vs. Objective to Max NPV of Timber + Lifecycle Carbon
in Figure 3.16 that the effect of credits for avoided emissions on the NPV of FM are generally
small (relative to the overall effect of a carbon market on the NPV of FM) and non-linear, peaking
at around $5/t CO2e and then declining, to effectively no change, at higher carbon credit values –
except for the AE4 scenario, which peaks at about a 20% increase in NPV of FM at $5/t CO2e and
then declines to approximately a 5% increase at $25/t CO2e.
The non-linear nature of avoided emissions on the NPV of FM across carbon prices is interest-
ing, and to investigate it further we look at Figures 3.17 and 3.18. Figure 3.17 displays how our
avoided emissions factors affect mean timber havest levels as carbon prices rise, and shows that
while lower AE factors may slow the decline of timber production marginally (versus the results
for objective 3 alone), higher AE factors begin to reverse the decline of harvest activity with car-
bon price – to the point where harvest remains at a relatively steady level over our range of carbon
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Figure 3.17: Mean Periodic Harvest Volumes over the Planning Horizon, Across Avoided Emissions Rates
Figure 3.18: Total Net Timber Harvest Revenue per Harvested Volume
prices for AE4.
However, while higher AE factors may reverse the decline in harvest activity with carbon price,
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Figure 3.19: Percentage of Total Harvested Volume Taken from Mid-to-Far Haul Zones
Figure 3.20: Average Silvicultural Expenditure per Hectare Harvested over the Planning Horizon
Figure 3.18 shows that this occurs along with a decline in the average revenue per cubic metre of
timber harvested, which helps to explain the non-linear effect on the NPV of FM. This reduction
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in average revenue per cubic metre can be explained by a number of factors, including the harvest-
ing of younger stands with fewer cubic metres per hectare of biomass (which is necessitated by
increasing harvest activity) (not shown), an increase in the proportion of harvested stands that are
located in the mid to far haul zones (which increases the cost of logging activity) (see Figure 3.19),
and an increase in the average silvicultural expenditure per hectare to regenerate harvested areas
(see Figure 3.20).
Product Substitution and the Supply of Carbon Credits
Given that the inclusion of credits for avoided emissions from product substitution is found to mod-
erate the decline in mean harvest volumes found to occur with other carbon accounting frameworks
in this paper, it is interesting to examine how avoided emissions factors affect the supply of carbon
credits from FM.
Figure 3.21 shows how the total NPV of carbon credits generated when avoided emissions are
included in the firm’s objective function compares to our other model specifications. What we
find is that the value of carbon credits generated by the FM firm over the range of AE factors
considered differs little from the value of carbon credits generated under objective function 3:
which maximizes the NPV of timber and lifecycle carbon credits without consideration of product
substitution rates. Only at the high end of avoided emissions factors considered (AE4) and at
relatively low carbon prices do we see any separation between the value of carbon credits generated
with avoided emissions credits included and our prior specification without avoided emissions
credits accounted for.
To look for specific effects on carbon sequestration by carbon pool/emissions source, Figure
3.22 looks specifically at scenario AE4, and breaks the analysis of carbon credits generated when
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Figure 3.21: Total NPV of Carbon Credits Generated
including avoided emissions down into the particular pool/source of the carbon credit. These results
are then compared to the carbon credits generated by pool/source under the same objective function,
but excluding credits for avoided emissions. The results show that the increase in mean harvest
levels with avoided emissions at AE4 leads to a reduction in both forest landscape carbon credits
and in offsets from secondary emissions reductions – which are due to increased biomass removal
from the forest landscape and an associated increase in milling activity. These reductions in carbon
credits are partially offset by a reduction in the carbon debits incurred from the WP sector, as more
timber is allocated to wood product production.
The most interesting feature of Figure 3.22, however, are the respective curves for credits gen-
erated for avoided emissions in the scenario including AE4, and the ‘potential’ avoided emissions
debits that would have been generated under objective function 3, had they been accounted for in
our lifecycle analysis. This result suggests that the reduction in mean harvest levels in carbon ac-
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Figure 3.22: NPV of Carbon Credits Generated, by Pool /Emissions Source
counting frameworks excluding product substitution credits fails to account for potential reductions
in avoided emissions from construction lumber, if it can safely be assumed that this sector would
revert to more carbon intensive forms of construction material in the absence of wood products.
3.5 Discussion & Conclusion
This paper has developed an innovative linear programming model capable of incorporating both
traditional timber production and a detailed representation of forest and WP carbon into a joint ob-
jective function to analyze FM decisions in the boreal at the firm level. A detailed life-cycle carbon
accounting framework is built into this LP model, including tracking of: forest landscape carbon,
wood product-stored carbon, secondary emissions from timber harvest, transport and milling ac-
tivities, as well as avoided emissions from product substitution. This modeling framework is then
applied to a representative FM area in the boreal plains region of western Canada, to evaluate the
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FM implications of different objectives for the forestry firm, such as (i) approaches similar to pre-
vious studies in the literature, which analyze objectives for the firm to maximize the volume of
timber harvested, the total tonnage of sequestered carbon on the forest landscape, in wood prod-
ucts, or in the forest and WP sector jointly; or (ii) an approach which seeks to optimize the NPV
of FM to the firm, including joint analysis of the returns to timber production and carbon credit
production (under a range of carbon accounting frameworks).
Results in the paper have indicated that the form of the objective function considered when
assessing forest carbon management decisions can have significant effects on the FM strategies
that are obtained. Similar to several other papers in the literature (Hennigar et al. 2008; Perez-
Garcia et al. 2005; Schlamadinger and Marland 1995) we find that the total quantity of carbon
sequestered differs little when a firm is asked to choose between maximizing the volume of carbon
stored on the forest landscape, or maximizing the volume of carbon stored on the forest landscape
and in wood products. However, management strategies diverge sharply when the firm’s objective
is to maximize the NPV of FM, as opposed to maximizing specific forest management outputs.
Analysis here suggests that a forestry firm that has an objective to maximize the NPV of forest
carbon credits added to its traditional objective to maximize the NPV of timber harvest will be
expected to reduce harvest activity more sharply, select a greater proportion of hardwood species
for harvest, generate a higher overall value of carbon credits, and enjoy a greater increase in the
NPV of forest management, than a firm facing a similar objective, but also including WP carbon
accounting.
Moreover, incorporating a more complete life-cycle carbon accounting framework, including
not only forest and wood product stored carbon, but also secondary emissions associated with sil-
viculture, logging, transport of lumber to mill and wood products to market, and milling activity, is
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found to alter incentives even further. When maximizing the NPV of FM to both timer production
and credits accumulating under our life-cycle carbon accounting framework, firms are found to
have incentives to reduce harvest activity even more sharply than when considering forest land-
scape carbon alone, but to favour softwood lumber for harvest instead of hardwood. The intensity
of silvicultural investment is also found to increase under this scenario, consistent with a firm at-
tempting to speed the regeneration of softwood-leading stands following harvest.
The results summarized here suggest that for firms seeking to maximize the NPV of FM, in-
stead of the total aggregate quantity of carbon stored from forest management, there are several
key tradeoffs that may be encountered (depending on the carbon accounting framework adopted).
Firms that are only able to generate credits for carbon stored on the forest landscape will seek to
reduce harvest and favour the selection of lower biomass-density, faster regenerating species to
meet timber production objectives. Harvest activity will also become concentrated in lower cost
areas, closer to the mill. Firms that must consider a carbon accounting framework including both
forest landscape carbon and wood-product stored carbon face a trade-off; since if they seek to gen-
erate forest carbon credits using the method described above, they will simultaneously generate
wood product carbon debits due to the reduction of wood product stored carbon versus what was
produced in the baseline (BAU) case. In this paper, FM strategies to increase forest landscape car-
bon storage largely dominated, although there was moderation in the decline of mean harvest rates
and more even selection across species for timber production when wood product stored carbon
was considered in the objective. However, future studies should consider the sensitivity of these
findings to our assumptions regarding wood product carbon residency and decay parameters.
Including secondary emissions from timber production in the overall carbon accounting frame-
work further altered the nature of the tradeoffs faced by FM firms; since reducing harvest under this
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more complete life-cycle accounting will generate additional carbon offsets for reduced emissions
from timber harvest, transport and milling. These offsets for reduced emissions are also found to
largely dominate the potential for generating carbon credits for wood product carbon storage, with
savings from reduced milling activity making up by far the largest component of potential offsets
from secondary emission factors. However, our results here may again be sensitive to the assumed
wood product carbon residency and decay factors, as well as (primarily) the emissions factor for
milling activity, and other assumptions for these parameters should be tested.
Although it is unclear how avoided emissions for product substitution should be included in any
forest carbon accounting framework, and despite substantial uncertainty over what an appropriate
product substitution rate should be, we also evaluated the impact of including different avoided
emissions factors in an objective for the firm to maximize timber returns and lifecycle carbon cred-
its – primarily to facilitate comparisons to other papers in the literature. Results from the inclusion
of product substitution accounting showed that the additional impact of credits for avoided emis-
sions on FM decisions (and returns) were marginal, except at the highest product substitution rates
considered. Nevertheless, at substitution rates in excess of 0.5 t C/m3, we find incentives for firms
to significantly moderate the decline in harvest activity realized without inclusion of avoided emis-
sions credits in their objective functions. In these cases, reducing harvest not only creates debits
for reductions in wood product stored carbon, but also reduces the quantity of construction lum-
ber available to displace other forms of construction material, creating debits for reduced rates of
product substitution as well.
At higher product substitution rates, debits with reduced harvest come to rival the potential for
credits from reduced secondary emissions, and create incentives for firms to attempt to maintain
mean harvest levels closer to those in the baseline scenario (although with a higher proportion of
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softwood to hardwood timber). The effect of incentives from avoided emissions credits/debits on
the NPV of FM to the firm is non-linear, however, as gains at lower carbon prices give way to
increased costs of timber harvest and more intensive silvicultural activity to regenerate softwood
stands and recover forest carbon stocks as carbon prices rise. Moreover, the value of carbon credits
produced with or without inclusion of credits for avoided emissions is found to be nearly equivalent
across all considered product substitution rates, suggesting that whether or not to allow FM firms
to accrue credits for avoided emissions may largely entail a policy decision to provide incentives
for different forest management activities, but with very little effect on total sequestered carbon.
These results suggest that there are substantial sustainable forest management (SFM) implica-
tions for the various carbon accounting frameworks suggested and investigated above. Through
changes in the incentives for FM firms to alter their mean harvest rates, species selection, and sil-
vicultural investment/intensity, the alternative carbon accounting frameworks explored here could
have very different impacts on the structure and function of the forested landscape, and also on the
value of the forest for communities dependent on the forestry sector, or interested in forest-based
recreation or other forest-based ecosystem services. As an example, consider Figure 3.23, which
illustrates how our range of different FM objective functions impacts the total proportion of the FM
area conserved (i.e. never accessed for harvest) over the planning horizon. As is evident, carbon
accounting frameworks that provide incentives to reduce harvest also increase the area of conserved
forest, as harvest activity becomes isolated in specific regions of the FM area, closer to the mill.
Eventually, objectives that maximize returns to carbon management lead to a greater proportion of
the forest area conserved than even objectives to maximize the total volume of carbon sequestered,
although only at relatively high carbon prices.
Moreover, the composition of harvest activity differs under each of the objective functions
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Figure 3.23: Percentage of Forest Management Area Conserved (Never Accessed for Harvest) over the Planning
Horizon
considered, which can impact the value of the forest for other SFM objectives, like species habitat.
As shown in McCarney et al. (2008), forest carbon management may produce significant co-
benefits for species habitat by reducing harvest and increasing the average age-class structure of
the forest, but these benefits will depend on how timber selection for harvest/conservation matches
with key species’ preferred habitats. Similarly, changes in incentives to focus harvest on different
timber-types may also affect the profile of the forest products industry over a region, favouring/
disfavouring communities reliant on timber or pulp and paper production. Forest communities
dependent on the forestry sector more generally may also be negatively impacted by incentives
to reduce harvest volumes for carbon management beyond levels that can sustain milling activ-
ity. Further analysis should be undertaken to examine how regulatory requirements to maintain
minimum harvest levels for more sustainable forest communities can be merged with the different
carbon accounting frameworks investigated here, as in Elgie et al. (2011).
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Finally, it should be noted that this study adopted a hypothetical boreal forest landscape for
analysis, composed of equal areas of representative boreal plains species types, so as to investigate
the FM incentives resulting from a market for carbon without biasing results due to limitations
in the assumed structure of the forest landscape. As a result, the outcomes of this analysis with
respect to the total NPV of FM in the boreal plains, the total potential carbon supply, or timber
harvest volumes, should be taken as illustrative only, and not an accurate reflection of boreal forest
production potential. Further work is ongoing to extend the analysis in this paper to a more ‘real-
istic’ boreal forest management area, with more specific species and age-class characteristics. In
addition, we have not considered any vertical linkages in this paper between the FM firm and the
rest of the forestry industry, such as the milling sector (beyond assignment of responsibility for car-
bon credits). FM firm interests in mills may alter the incentive structure described here, and affect
firm interests in maintaining harvest levels despite the incentives provided by carbon markets.
Nevertheless, analysis in this paper has illustrated the importance of different assumptions re-
garding the objectives for forest carbon management, and of the carbon pools/emission sources
included in any carbon accounting framework faced by a FM firm. The choice over the relevant
carbon accounting framework will ultimately come down to particular policy decisions taken when
a carbon credit market is established, and it has been shown here that these policy decisions will
affect the structure and function of boreal forest management areas, with implications for forest-
dependent communities, SFM values, and the nature of the Canadian forest industry. Moreover,
the results in this paper suggest that readers should take caution in interpreting the results of papers
that evaluate the FM implications of objectives to maximize timber harvest volumes or total carbon
sequestered absent considerations of the NPV of these alternative frameworks as, absent specific
regulatory instructions for the forest industry to consider such objectives, the market incentives
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This dissertation has presented three papers related to climate, resource use, and market applica-
tions for sustainable development in developed/developing countries. While addressing separate
topics, the three papers are broadly consistent in their overall application of market approaches
to inform or enable productive investment in natural resource sectors (specifically agriculture and
forestry). The first two papers applied insights from economic contract theory and the recent liter-
ature in the climate sciences, respectively, to examine the design characteristics of a new financial
market innovation in developing countries (weather-based index insurance for agriculture), and its
potential to improve poor, smallholder farmer’s ability to undertake productive investments and
manage climate risk. The last paper, in turn, looked at the context of forest resource management
in Canada, and what the application of new carbon constraints and a market for carbon would
mean for investment, production decisions, and indicators of sustainable forest management in the
Canadian boreal.
In the first paper, a game-theoretic economic model is developed to investigate the linkages
between credit and insurance markets for smallholder farmers, and how weather index insurance
may help to overcome credit constraints in rural financial markets of developing countries. Results
suggest that bundling index insurance with a credit contract will have two separate effects. First,
linking an index insurance product to a credit contract alters the expected return of the contract
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to the lender by reducing the probability that the farmer will default. This change in the expected
return of the contract, if passed along to the farmer, will help to lower their cost of credit. Secondly,
index insurance will also affect the incentive compatibility of a credit contract with moral hazard.
Depending on the specific incidence of basis risk in the product, index insurance can work to
alleviate the risk smoothing effect of insurance for the farmer by separating returns across states
of the world, conditional on the index. In such cases, the farmer will be incentivized to apply
higher effort by the index insurance product itself, so that the lender no longer needs to do so
through the terms of the lending contract. In this way, the paper highlights that index insurance acts
much like a random contract, and concludes that it is essential to consider not only how insurance
will alter the cost of risk, but also how local conditions, institutions, and incentives interact with
insurance and credit markets in order to open or restrict the supply of credit – and accordingly how
index insurance might be expected to impact smallholder farmer ability to undertake productive
investments to improve their livelihoods.
The second paper extends consideration of agricultural climate-risk management to the poten-
tial predictability of late-season rainfall over monsoonal Indonesia, with the aim of better under-
standing: (i) forecast skill and risk in this region, and (ii) how forecast information may be better
tied with financial market products, such as index insurance, to improve smallholder farmer in-
centives, decision-making, and livelihoods under climate risk. The results obtained are suggestive
about the potential to use targeted forecast information to inform the structure and design of index
insurance markets, and to improve the sustainability of index insurance pilots and programs. From
an economic perspective, findings indicate that emerging ENSO events may be locally signalled
through observable indicators such as the timing of the previous season monsoon cessation, and
suggest that insurance markets will need to take account of this information in index insurance pric-
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ing and/or the timing of insurance sales in order to avoid issues of adverse selection in insurance
markets. Secondly, from a climate science perspective, predictability of regional rainfall charac-
teristics is shown to develop progressively through the season, with information on the timing of
monsoon onset emerging as early as the leading MJJ, while predictability of late season rainfall
anomalies emerges later, with predictability of the strength of emerging El Niño events. The paper
concludes by arguing that this difference in the timing of information availability could inform
index insurance product design in innovative ways, to allow farmers to better take advantage of
forecast information to inform productive investments or decision-making as it is revealed and/or
communicated at key points through the season.
Finally, the third paper looked at forest resource management in Canada, and what a market
for carbon would mean for investment, production decisions, and indicators of sustainable forest
management in the Canadian boreal – both in respects to the management of the landscape (i.e. the
forest resource), and the development of the forestry sector and forest-based communities. Results
suggest that for firms responding to carbon market incentives while seeking to maximize the NPV
of forest management, there are several key tradeoffs that may be encountered, depending on the
carbon accounting framework adopted by policy-makers. Firms that are only able to generate cred-
its for carbon stored on the forest landscape will seek to reduce harvest and favour the selection
of lower biomass-density, faster regenerating species to meet timber production objectives. Har-
vest activity will also become concentrated in lower cost areas, closer to the mill. Firms that must
consider a carbon accounting framework including both forest carbon and wood-product stored
carbon will face a different trade-off; since if they seek to generate forest carbon credits using the
method described above, they will simultaneously generate wood product carbon debits due to the
reduction of wood product stored carbon versus what was produced in the baseline (BAU) case.
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Including secondary emissions from timber production in the overall carbon accounting frame-
work further alters the nature of the decision faced by firms, since reducing harvest under this
more complete life-cycle accounting will generate additional carbon offsets for reduced emissions
from timber harvest, transport and milling. While simulations here suggest that, for the Canadian
boreal, offsets for reduced secondary emissions may dominate the potential for generating car-
bon credits through wood product carbon storage, these findings may be sensitive to the assumed
wood product carbon residency and decay factors used, as well as (primarily) the emissions factor
for milling activity, and so future studies should consider the sensitivity of findings to these pa-
rameters. Nevertheless, by generating incentives for forest management firms to alter their mean
harvest rates, species selection, and silvicultural intensities, the observations in this paper suggest
that carbon markets could have substantial sustainable forest management (SFM) implications and
that – importantly – these SFM impacts may differ depending on specific policy decisions around
the carbon accounting framework to be applied. This highlights a key task for policy-makers in
designing carbon markets for sustainable forest management, as the alternative carbon accounting
frameworks explored here could have very different impacts on the structure and function of the
forested landscape, and also on the value of the forest for communities dependent on the forestry
sector, interested in forest-based recreation, or reliant on other forest-based ecosystem services.
Overall, the findings of these three papers speak to different aspects of sustainability, and the
challenge of sustainable development, including: (i) howmarket incentives can influence decision-
making in natural resource use, with implications for sustainable resource development, as well
as (ii) the potential for well-designed financial market tools (such as insurance) to help unlock
investment and support development in natural resources sectors under threat of climate shocks.
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